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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Jurisdiction

in

this

case

is conferred

upon

this

Court

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-2A-3 (2) (h) (1986) in that it
was

transferred

Court,

to the Court of Appeals from the I Jtah Supreme

to which

Jurisdiction

the appeal was initially sought by the Board.

also

appears

to

be

conferred

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 782A-3 (2)

upon

this

Court

.986) in that it

involves an appeal from a district court review of a final order
or decree of a state agency.
language

of

the Utah

jurisdictional

Supreme

issues in

However, in a similar appeal, the
Court

in

its discussion

Utah Restaurant Association

of

the

v. Davis

County Board of Health, 709 P. 2d 1159 (Ui ill I 1985), creates some
question as to whether such a challenge to Board rulemaking would
fall within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-2A-3 (2) (a)
(1986).

In that action, the Court explained

that the district

court's jurisdiction to review the rulemaking decisions in that
action

arose

only

under

the Declaratory

Judgment Act and

under Sections 26-24-20 (4), (5) and (6) of the Act,

not

The Court

emphasized:
It is the Board's "final determination' in such a
matter that subpart (5) permits the courts to review at
the instigation of either the department or the
complaining party.
Since this case involves only a
challenge to the Board rulemaking, Section 26-24-20 (5)
cannot provide a basis for jurisdiction. 709 P. 2d at
1161.
However, whether under Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-2A-3 (2) (a)
or (h), jurisdiction has been properly conferred upon this Court
to review this case.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING
This
brought

case

by

involves

an

action

plaintiffs-respondents

for

declaratory

(hereinafter

judgment

referred

to as

"plaintiffs'1) in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County to
determine the validity of certain "fees" imposed by the Salt Lake
City-County

Board

"Board") pursuant
Licensing
parties

of

Health

Determination

referred

to a certain "Food Service/Food

Fee Standard"
entered

(hereinafter

into

a

adopted

by

Stipulation

(hereinafter

referred

the Board.
of
to

the

Establishment
The respective

Facts
as

to as

and

the

Issues

for

"Stipulation")

together with various Exhibits, which was submitted to the Court.
Each party submitted

its respective Motion for Summary Judgment

and Memoranda in support of its Motion and in opposition to the
opposing

Motion,

seeking

the Court's determination based

those facts and documents.

upon

The Court issued its Ruling in the

form of a minute entry on June 24, 1987 (R. 166-167), and after
various objections were heard and resolved, the Court entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 191-197) and Judgment
(R.

198-200)

on

August

18,

1987.

In view

of

their

central

importance to the resolution of this matter, the Stipulation and
its attached Exhibits, as well as the District Court's Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment are attached hereto
as portions of the addendum to this Brief.

2

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The

determinative

plaintiffs1
Sees.

addendum

statutes

are

set

to this Brief and

26-24-14, 26-24-18 and

26-24-20

forth

in

full

in

include Utah Code Ann.
from

the Local Board of

Health Act, together with Utah Code Ann* Sec- 26-1-6 and

Sec.

10-8-80.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As earlier reflected, this case was presented to the Court
upon a Stipulation of Facts and Issues for Determination (R. 46).
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by the Board (R. 7374)

were

included

as

that

those

stipulating
plaintiffs
reflected

did
the

not

Exhibits
Findings

stipulate

existing

to

the

were

that

facts.

Stipulation.
entered,

the
In

however,

Findings

fact,

While
the

accurately

plaintiffs

have

emphasized that no evidence supporting any of the dollar costs of
the food inspection program or amounts to be produced from the
license fees were ever presented upon the record, except through
the Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law themselves.
The only items of ^testimony, documents, papers, Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, or Orders of the Board regarding the
proposal
reflected

for

the

adoption of

the

in the Exhibits attached

licensing

fee standard

to the Stipulation

were

(R. 49,

Para. 7 ) .
Those Exhibits accurately reflected

the times, places, and

purposes, as well as all actions taken, comments made, and other
3

input given at the public hearing.
public hearing

on

the licensing

Due and proper notice of the

fee standard was given by the

Board (R. 53-54) and a public hearing was conducted on September
10, 1986, by a Board-appointed hearing officer
Department (R. 60-65).

from the Health

A copy of the proposed Standard was made

available as part of the Notice to the public by the Board prior
to that public hearing (R. 55-59).
attended the public hearing.
health

department

Approximately thirty persons

No member of the Board or the local

was present, other than the hearing officer.

At that public hearing, all of the testimony and comments were
adverse to the adoption of the proposed licensing fee standard.
No testimony nor evidence of any sort was presented by the Board,
the

department,

adoption

of

nor

that

its

hearing

standard

officer

(R. 60-65).

in

support

of

the

Persons attending

the

meeting were informed that a summary of the hearing and written
comments
meeting

would

be

on October

submitted

to

2, 1986, and

the

Board

before

its

regular

that interested parties could

attend that meeting and make additional comments before the Board
if they desired.
The meeting held on October 2, 1986, was a regular meeting
of

the Board and not a "public hearing" within the meaning of

Utah

Code Ann. Sec. 26-24-20 (1981).

The required notice for

such a "public hearing" was not published regarding that meeting.
At that time, the Board had before it a summary of the comments
from the earlier public hearing, written comments from the public
and

Health

Department

staff prepared
4

subsequent

to the public

hearing (R. 75-79), and proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of

Law

(R.

73-74),

as

well

as

the

licensing

fee

standard.

Further oral comments were invited from the private parties and
staff in attendance.
voted

to

implement

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board
the

licensing

fee

standard, whereupon

the

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were executed (Draft of
Record of Board Meeting, R. 66-72).
The dollar

amounts, categories and definitions applied to

those categories as reflected in the licensing fee standard were
prepared by, and adopted based upon the recommendations of, the
Health

Department

staff.

The

Board's

determination

that

the

dollar

amounts, categories and definitions were reasonable was

based upon the recommendations of that staff and the Board's own
deliberations, without any public input in regard to those dollar
amounts, categories or definitions (R. 50, Para. 10).
The inspections contemplated in the standard constituted no
change from previously conducted

inspections, except that those

inspections were paid with Health Department funds (R. 49, Para.
8).
The

licensing

fee standard

established

fee categories and

fee amounts ranging from $15.00 to $100.00 per year, based upon
factors

including

seats,

the

whether

it

number
was

a

the

number

of

square

food

of

service

feet

service/ food

center, or a nursing home.

in

the

the

number

establishment,

establishment, a day

(R. 55-59).

5

bays,

of
and
care

Following
plaintiffs

the

filed

adoption
this

of

action

the

for

licensing

a

fee

declaratory

standard,

judgment

to

determine the validity of the licensing fee standard.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff's arguments

in this appeal may be summarized as

follows:
POINT I.

There is no statutory authority for the imposition

of the licensing fees attempted to be imposed by the defendant.
(a)

Utah Code Ann. Sec. 26-24-14 (14) (1981) was not

intended by the legislature to grant the Board authority to
impose licensing
imposition

of

certificates,

fees.

charges
copying

It was only
for

such

fees

intended

minor

and

to authorize

items as preparing

similar

services

to

particular persons for their specific benefit, such as have
been traditionally imposed by governmental bodies.
(b)

Absent such statutory authority, the Board has no

inherent power to charge any fees.
(c)
rules,

The granting of the power to the Board to adopt
regulations

and

standards

and

to

conduct

health

inspections does not imply power to impose fees to cover the
costs of their services, particularly where the legislature
has specifically provided other methods of financing those
inspections

through

appropriations

from

the general

fund,

the levy of a tax or from local, state or federal funds, as
provided by Utah Code Ann. Sec. 26-24-16 (1987).

6

(d)

Even

though

disallowing

such

fees

may

cause

increased taxation, the legislated means of financing those
services should be given effect.
(e)

The "wide latitude

of discretion" to be given the

Board as an administrative tribunal has no effect upon the
Board's

lack

of statutory authority to impose the license

fees involved in this case.
(f)

Where the record is devoid of any support for the

Board's Findings,

"wide latitude of discretion" should not

be applied to fill that void.
POINT II.
(a)

The licensing fee standard is a tax, not a fee.
The licensing

fee standard

is a revenue raising

measure with no reasonable relationship to the cost of any
increased service.
(b)

The

"demonstrable
merely

licensing

benefit"

continues

to

fee
the

standard

food

inspections

provides

establishments.

which

were

no
It

previously

conducted without charge.
(c)

The benefit of the inspections is to the public,

not to individual food establishments.
(d)

There is no uniformity among, and no valid basis

for the unequal treatment of, the various classifications of
food

establishments

as

reflected

standard.

7

in

the

licensing

fee

(e)

The licensing fee standard improperly attempts to

divide food establishments

into various component parts to

provide additional fund raising bases.
POINT III.
Law

were

not

The Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
supported

by

evidence

Findings

of

Fact

presented

at

the

public

hearing.
(a)

and

Conclusions

of

Law

are

statutorily mandated by Utah Code Ann. Sec. 26-24-20 (1981).
(b)
some

Where such Findings are mandated, they must have

support

in

the

record,

or

the

legislative

mandate

serves no purpose.
(c)

There is no support for the Findings of the Board

from the record of the public hearing on September 10, 1986.
(d)

The meeting of the Board on October 2, 1986, was

not such a mandated "public hearing".
(e)
standard,
personal

The

Board,

relied

solely

judgment,

in

adopting

on

staff

neither

of

the

input

which

licensing
and

was

on

produced

fee

its

own

at

the

public hearing.
(f)
supporting

There is no evidence or information in the record
the

various

categories

of

the

licensing

fee

standard, the actual cost of the food inspection program for
such

categories

or as a whole, the amount which would be

produced by such inspections, or the rationale behind having
one-third

of

the

cost

of

inspection fees.
8

the

entire

program

borne

by

(g) Findings of Fact, supported upon the record of a
public hearing,

serve a valid purpose in establishing

the

basis for the Order and in assuring the public an effective
opportunity for determining the accuracy of input, rebutting
inaccurate
concerns

input, verifying

regarding

presentations, and

the bases alleged as

explaining

support

for such

order.
(h)

Findings of

public hearing,
previous

further

Utah

fees,

so

body

that

Court

must

to persons

constitutional

serve a valid purpose

Supreme

administrative
calculations

Fact, supported by the record of a

pronouncements

disclose

challenging

compliance

with

in meeting

the

that

an

of

its

bases

the reasonableness of

the various

statutory and

standards can be ascertained by a reviewing

court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE BOARD DOES
NOT HAVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO ENACT THE FEE SCHEDULE
EMBODIED IN ITS FOOD SERVICE/FOOD ESTABLISHMENT
LICENSING FEE STANDARDS
Utah

Code

establishment
Code

Ann.

Ann.

26-24-16

and

appropriated

from

from

state

local,

26,

Chapter

24, provides

for

and operation of local health departments.

Sec.

establishment

Title

(1987) declares

operation

of

those

that

funding

departments

the
Utah

for the

is

to

be

the General Fund, from the levy of a tax or
or

federal

funds.
9

Notwithstanding

that

provision, the Board adopted the licensing fee standard involved
in this action, imposing certain charges
of

the

Salt

Lake

City-County

Health

to ". . • pay a portion
Department's

reasonable

expenses of inspecting and enforcing State and local food rules
and regulations."
As
relied

reflected
upon

Utah

(R. 55).
in

those

Code

standards,

Ann.

Sec.

the

26-24-14

Board
(14)

specifically
(1981),

which

provides the powers and duties of local health departments:
(14)
Establish and collect appropriate fees, to
accept, use and administer all federal, state or
private donations or grants of
funds, property,
services or materials for public health purposes, and
to make such agreements, not inconsistent with law, as
may be required as a condition to receiving such
donation or grant. . .
The

Board

contends

that

this

subsection

creates

statutory

authority allowing it to impose inspection fees, and asserts that
its

actions

Department

are

which

no

different

charges

than

fees

those of

the State Health

for various permits.

The State

Health Department's authority to impose such fees was established
by Utah Code Ann. Sec. 26-1-6 (1981), part of the same act that
established

the

local

health

departments.

However,

that

authority of the State Department of Health was granted subject
to very guarded restrictions:
The department may adopt a schedule of fees that may be
assessed for services rendered by the department,
provided that such fees shall be reasonable and fair
and shall be submitted to and approved by the legislature as part of the department's annual appropriations request . . ." Utah Code Ann. Sec. 26-1-6
(1981).

10

Both

the

requirement

specific

for

grant

legislative

of

authority

the

legislature

the

specific

review are conspicuously absent in

relation to the local boards of health.
that

and

would

give

local

It seems unreasonable
health departments

the

carte blanche to impose inspection fees, such as those claimed by
the

Board,

while

carefully

limiting

the powers

Department of Health to impose similar fees.
a

reasonable

reasonable
local

meaning

to

interpretation

health

grant powers

departments
similar

all
is
to

applicable
that

of

State

In order to provide
sections,

the provision

impose

the

fees was

the

allowing

intended

more
the

only to

to those of other governmental bodies to

impose ministerial or clerical

fees for preparing certificates,

making copies or other services specifically requested by a party
and which benefit that party, not the public in general.
Unless

Utah

Code

Ann.

Sec.

26-24-14

(14)

(1981)

is

interpreted as legislative authorization for imposition of "fees"
such as those imposed in the present case, the Board has no power
or authority to impose those fees.
heretofore

declared

in

reference

The Utah Supreme Court has
to a

similar

inspection

fee

program by a similarly established local Board of Health, ". . .
the Board has no inherent power to charge fees or levy taxes of
any

kind.

Any

such authority

must be conferred on it by the

county which created

it, acting within its lawful authority, or

by the legislature."

Utah Restaurant Association v. Davis County

Board of Health, 709 P. 2d 1159, 1161 (Utah 1985).

The Supreme

Court did not reach a determination of the issue of whether or
11

not

the

fees actually

constituted

a

tax or

could properly

be

imposed by a local Board of Health since it determined that the
Board

failed to properly promulgate the fee schedule, which was

dispositive of the case.

No statutory authority for imposition

of such fees was cited by the Court nor do the provisions of the
act creating the local boards of health (Utah Code Ann, Title 26,
Chapter 12) reflect statutory authority for the Board's attempt
to offset

substantial

portions of

the cost of its operations,

including salaries and overhead of various programs, through the
imposition of such "fees".
However,
specifically

the Board argues, the Supreme Court's failure to
find that such fees may not be imposed, buttresses

their position,

since

the Court did explain, by way of dicta,

that should a similar fee regulation be attempted by the Board in
the

future,

compliance

it

would

with

the

Department Act."

be

"well

procedures

advised
required

to
by

do
the

so

in

Local

careful
Health

Utah Restaurant Association, supra, at 1161.

However, the Court did not attempt to specify all of the factors
to be considered to determine the validity of any such fees.

It

merely indicated that there were certain factors which should be
considered in determining whether charges were "fees" or "taxes".
The Court gave no indication that it was attempting to overrule
the

long

boards
court's

line

to

of

impose

authorities
fees.

determination

that

relating

It also
Utah

did

Code

to the powers of
not
Ann.

(1981) was intended to authorize charges for:
12

overrule

such

the lower

Sec. 26-24-14

(14)

(S)uch minor items as preparing certificates, copying
fees, and similar
fees for specific services to
particular persons for their specific benefit, such as
have been traditionally imposed by governmental bodies.
In view of the Supreme Court's emphasis that the Board has
no

"inherent

power

of

health

power"

the Board

inspections

to charge any
or

fees,

local health

should

the mere generalized

department

not be deemed

to make public

adequate authority

to

impose fees to cover the cost of inspections.

Neither should the

Board's

power

and

promote

the public

to

adopt

rules,

health

regulations

under Utah

standards

to

Code Ann. Sec. 26-24-20

(1981) be interpreted as granting such authority.
Plaintiffs

recognize

that

decisions

of

the Utah

Supreme

Court, such as Provo City v. Provo Meat Packing Company, 49 Utah
528, 165 P. 477 (1917); Best Foods v. Christensen, 75 Utah 392,
285 P. 1001 (1930); and Salt Lake City v. Bennion Gas & Coal Co.,
15 P. 2d 648 (Utah 1932), have found that the power to impose a
"license fee or a license tax" is within the police powers of the
state

to regulate or prohibit a business and that inherent in

those powers is the power to tax for the cost of such regulation.
However,

those

cases

arose

out

of

the

taxing

powers

governing body, which the Board does not possess.
respectfully

submitted

of

the

Further, it is

that such inherent powers to charge for

the costs of regulation are inapplicable to situations where the
legislature

has

funding

to

is

specifically
be

secured,

set
as

forth
in

the

the

manner

present

in

which

case.

The

legislature provided that local boards are to be funded from the
General Fund, from the levy of a tax, or from local, state or
13

federal funds.

There is no basis for implying a right to impose

a fee to cover the costs of services of local boards.

In Hill v.

City of Eureka, 35 C.A. 2d 154, 94 P. 2d 1025, 1027 (1939), the
California

Court was confronted with a similar situation where

the legislative charter to a city expressed its right M to provide
for

licensing

establish
licenses

any and all business

not prohibited

regulate

and

and
and

the

the

collection

issuing
of

taxes."

granting
The

by
of

law; to
municipal

charter

further

provided that the city should "levy the taxes upon all property,
both

real

sufficient

and

personal,

revenue

in

the

to carry on

municipal government."

city,

necessary

to

raise

the various departments of the

While recognizing its lack of authority

to license attorneys, the city attempted to impose a license fee
upon

them

to raise

revenue

to help

fund

its operations.

The

Court explained:
The charter expressly designating the source from which
sufficient revenue shall be raised for the operation of
the city, it would seem unnecessary to raise additional
money from another source.
' It is an elementary rule
of construction that the expression of one excludes the
other.1
(citing cases). 94 P. 2d at 1027.
The Court further noted that the body seeking to impose the fee
did

not have the general power

revenue and regulation."
inspections
See

"to license for the purpose of

Even for counties, the right to conduct

implies no right to exact a tax merely for revenue.

Mountain

States

Telephone and

Telegraph

Co. v.

Salt Lake

County, 702 P. 2d 113 (Utah 1985); and Consolidated Coal Company
v. Emery County, 702 P. 2d 121 (Utah 1985).

In the present case,

the Board imposed fees to fund its inspection operations when it
14

did not possess the power to tax or to license for the purpose of
revenue and regulation.

The promulgation of those fees was not

within the statutory authority of the Board and is invalid.
Plaintiffs do not contest the power of the legislature to
grant statutory authority to the Board to impose appropriate fees
for

specific

legislature
inspection

services rendered.
has

not

fees.

granted

Plaintiffs merely contend the

the

Board

authority

to

impose

Plaintiffs recognize the import of user fees

and, in some circumstances where appropriate, the legislature has
determined that such fees are authorized to fund certain types of
limited operations.

However, the legislature has not authorized

the imposition of such fees by the Board to offset costs of its
food inspection programs.
The Board argues that if this Court should determine it has
no authority to impose such fees, it would effectively eliminate
11

...vital . . . programs financed in part through fees, with the

only alternative being
should

not

sway

the

massive

Court

tax

where

increases."
the legislation

This argument
specifically

contemplates additional taxation as the source of funding for the
local boards.

See Utal^ Code Ann. Sec. 26-24-16 (1987).

Further,

as the Utah Supreme Court has explained, that argument is more
properly

addressed

to the legislature.

supra., in invalidating

In Consolidated

Coal,

license fees imposed by the county, the

Court explained:
. . . (I)f it is necessary or desirable for counties to
raise revenues through licensing taxes, some limits
should exist to prevent some inequitable distributions
of the tax burden among a few businesses.
The
15

Legislature
is better
equipped
to
devise
such
limitations and to accommodate the competing interests
of counties and local businesses than the courts.
702 P. 2d at 126.
See also Mountain

States

Telephone and

Telegraph v. Salt Lake

County, 702 P. 2d 113 (Utah 1985).
Neither
affect

should

the

"wide

latitude of discretion" argument

the Court's decision.

presumption

of

validity

to

The general
any

rule grants

administrative

or

such a
judicial

tribunal, and properly so. However, that same rule applies to the
appellate review of those cases cited in Point III of this Brief.
As more fully explained therein, Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law must still be supported by evidence upon the record, or
the action of the lower tribunal cannot stand.
It

is

respectfully

submitted

that

the

District

Court

properly ruled that the Board did not have statutory authority to
enact

the

fee

schedule

embodied

in

its

Food

Service/Food

Establishment Licensing Fee Standards.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE LICENSING FEE
STANDARD AS IMPOSED BY THE BOARD IS A TAX NOT A FEE
In adopting
Fee

Standards,

provide general

its Food
the

Board

found

the

Establishment

Licensing

fee schedule necessary

to

revenue to cover a portion of the cost of its

food inspection program.
reasonable

Service/Food

The record reflects no evidence of any

relation between

the

fees

imposed and

the

services

rendered and, contrary to the Board's representations, it is not
"undisputed"

that

the

licensing
16

fee

standard

will

produce

revenues in an amount less than the expenses of inspection.

The

figures appear on the record solely in the Board's own Findings
of

Fact,

which

determination,
Brief.

The

services.
measure

should

as

have

discussed

fees

are

no

more

not

for

effect
fully

in

upon

the

Point

III of

improvement

or

Court's
this

enhancement

of

Rather, the schedule of fees is a revenue-increasing

with

no

reasonable

increased services.

relationship

to

the

cost

of

any

In fact, it is stipulated that the services

rendered to food establishments will not be increased as a result
of the fee standard but, rather, will remain at the same level as
the previous inspections.
no

demonstrable

benefit

plaintiffs, provides
they

are

imposed,

Further, the fee imposition provides
to

plaintiffs,

no uniformity
and

plaintiffs' businesses

involves

into various

additional fund raising bases.

was

not

requested

by

as

to the classes on which

an

attempt

to

divide

the

component parts to provide

As such, the imposition of those

fees constitutes a tax.
In a

series

developments,
distinction

of

the

between

"impact
Utah

fee" cases

Supreme

"taxes" and

determine that status.

regarding

Court

"fees"

has

and

the

subdivision

explained

the

factors which

In Weber Basin Home Builders v. Roy City,

26 Utah 2d 215, 487 P. 2d 866 (1971), the Court ruled that the
"fees" imposed by the city were discriminatory, unconstitutional
taxes, rather than fees.

The city of Roy raised the cost of a

building

the purpose

permit

fee

revenue for the city.

for

of

The Court explained:
17

obtaining

additional

If the money collected is for a license to engage in a
business and the proceeds therefrom are purported
mainly to service, regulate and police such business or
activity, it is regarded as a license fee.
On the
other hand, if the factors just stated are minimal, and
the money collected is mainly for raising revenue for
general municipal purposes, it is properly regarded as
the imposition of a tax, and this is so regardless of
the terms used to describe it . . . it is reasoned that
even though license fees sufficient to cover such costs
are a necessary concomitant of the police power, fees
in excess thereof are in reality a form of taxation,
which may not be imposed by the city without the
express authorization of the legislature.
Under the
undisputed facts as presented to the trial court: where
the basic flat-fee charge for a building permit was
increased in one jump from $12 to $112, which increase
admittedly had no relationship to
increased costs of
the service rendered; and more importantly, where the
declared purpose was to raise general revenue for the
City, . . . the increase placed a disproportionate and
unfair burden on new households in Roy City, as
compared to the old ones, in the maintenance of the
City government; and that consequently it was discriminatory and constitutionally impermissible. 487 P. 2d
at 867.
In Banberry Development Corp. v. South Jordan City, 631 P.
2d 899 (Utah 1981), the Court further mandated that, in order to
justify the imposition of a fee, there must be a "demonstrable
benefit"
bear

to

some

applicant.

the party upon which the fee was imposed and must

reasonable

relationship

to the need

created by

As the Court explained:

In remanding the case (Call v. City of West Jordan) for
trial on the constitutionality of the ordinance as
applied (i.e., the requirement that seven percent of
the subdivision land be dedicated), this Court ruled
that "the dedication should have some reasonable
relationship to the need created by the subdivision. .
. . Reasonableness obviously holds the municipality to
a higher standard of rationality than the requirement
that its actions not be arbitrary or capricious. Under
the reasonableness test in Call v. City of West Jordan,
Supra., the benefits derived from the exaction need not
accrue solely to the subdivision (614 P. 2d at 1259);
18

the

flood control and recreation are needs that cannot be
treated in isolation from the rest of the municipality.
At the same time, the benefits derived from the
exaction must be of 'demonstrable benefit* to the
subdivision (Id. at 1259).
631 P. 2d at 905 (emphasis
added).
See also Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P. 2d 271 (Utah 1979),
on reh. 614 P. 2d 1257 (Utah 1980).
In further discussions of the "impact fee" cases, the Court
in Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 P. 2d 375 (Utah 1982), noted the
distinction as to whether the fees were valid "fees" or invalid
"taxes" hinged on the basis that:
A
reasonable
charge
for
a specific
service
is
permissible, whereas a general fee that amounts to a
revenue measure is not.
* * * Th e validity of a fee
imposed to augment general revenues is determined by
its legal status at the time it is exacted, without
regard to how the funds are later allocated or spent.
In the present case, the Board acknowledged it has no power
to tax and

yet

it has imposed a "fee" with no showing of any

reasonable relationship to the cost of the services rendered and
with

no

showing

establishments

in

of

any

return

demonstrable
for

the

benefit

"fee".

The

to
Board

the

food

made

no

suggestion of increasing its services to the food establishments;
and the parties have stipulated that the inspections in the fee
schedule

would

constitute

no

change

from

the

previous

inspections, "except that the previous inspections were paid with
Health Department funds."
had

(R. 49, Para. 8 ) .

Even if the Board

the power to tax, an imposition such as in this case would

constitute an abuse of that power

19

in that it is merely raising

revenue

for

general

purposes

without

providing

specific

additional benefits.
In Continental Bank and Trust Co. v. Farmington City, 599 P.
2d

1242

(Utah

1979),

the City of

Farmington

imposed a fee on

Lagoon, ostensibly with an intent to apply the increased revenues
to upgrade the services to Lagoon.

However, no dedication of the

revenue funds were made for that specific purpose and the Court
held the ordinance invalid, explaining:
The conclusion is inescapable that a situation such as
the one at hand, where a municipality imposes a
potentially crippling tax on a single business for the
benefit of the community as a whole, coupled with vague
promises of improved services which the business has
not been guaranteed, and to a large extent, does not
need, presents such a case of abuse of taxing power.
599 P. 2d at 1246.
In

the present

case, an

whether called

imposition

of

charges by

the Board,

"fees" or "taxes", is similarly an abuse of the

Board's powers.

This

situation lacks even a vague promise of

improved services to the food service entities but only benefits
the community

as a whole.

The services provided by the Board

were not requested by the food service entities but, rather, are
actions mandated by state and local law to protect the interests
of

the

public

at

large.

The

restaurants

and

other

food

establishments must undergo the inspections or lose their permit
to

operate.

inspections
public,

Notwithstanding
may

help

protect

the sole benefit

the

Board's

plaintiffs

claims

from

that

these

lawsuits by

the

of those services are to the public.

The public does not know when or if a food establishment has been
inspected

and

the

number

of

inspections
20

conducted

on

such an

entity hinges more on its compliance with the health code than on
the

number

of

chairs

or

cash

registers

it

maintains.

If

inspections bestow any benefits upon a food establishment, those
benefits are, at best, only incidental.

The public receives the

benefit,

the Board

turning

the

"fee"

imposed

by

into

a

tax

promulgated through an abuse of power.
The United States Supreme Court has similarly found that a
benefit to the general public does not justify the imposition of
fees

only

performing

upon
the

certain

entities

services.

In

by

the administrative

National

Cable

agency

Television

Association v. United States, 94 S. Ct. 1146, 415 U.S. 336, 39 L.
Ed. 2d 370 (1974), the Court reversed the lower court's holding
of the validity of certain FCC "fees" where Congress had required
administrative agencies to charge for their services through the
enactment of the Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1952,
31 U.S.C. Sec. 483a.

That act provided, in part:

It is the sense of the Congress that any work, service
. . . benefit, . . . license, . . . or similar thing of
value or utility performed . . . by any Federal agency
.
to or for any person . . . shall be selfsustaining to the full extent possible, and the head of
each Federal agency is authorized by regulation . . .
to prescribe therefor . . . such fee . . . if any, as
he shall determine . . . to be fair and equitable
taking into consideration direct and indirect cost to
the Government, value to the recipient, public policy
or interest served, and other pertinent facts . . .
Based thereon, the FCC sought to impose a revised fee schedule
for CATV systems by estimating its direct and indirect costs for
CATV

regulation

filing

and

then, while retaining

fees, added an annual

its earlier

imposed

fee for each CATV system at $0.30
21

per

subscriber, on

the basis

that

this would

meet

its annual

costs and approximate the "value to the recipient" as required by
that Act.

The Court, with two dissenting votes, explained the

distinction between taxation and fee levying powers, as follows:
Taxation is a legislative function, and Congress, which
is
the
sole organ
for
levying
taxes, may act
arbitrarily and disregard benefits bestowed by the
Government on a taxpayer and go solely on ability to
pay, based on property or income. A fee, however, is
incident to a voluntary act, e. g., a request that a
public agency permit an applicant to practice law or
medicine or construct a house or run a broadcast
station.
The public agency performing those services
normally may exact a fee for a grant which, presumably,
bestows a benefit on the applicant, not shared by other
members of society.
* * *

There is no doubt that the main function of the
Commission is to safeguard the public interest in the
broadcasting activities of members of the industry. If
assessments are made by the Commission which are
sufficient to recoup costs to the Commission for its
oversight, the CATV's and other broadcasters would be
paying not only for benefits they received but for the
protective
services
rendered
the public
by
the
Commission.
* * *

While those who operate CATV's may receive special
benefits, we cannot be sure that the Commission used
the correct standard in setting the fee.
It is not
enough to figure the total cost (direct and indirect)
to the Commission
for operating a CATV unit of
supervision and then to contrive a formula that
reimburses the Commission for that amount. Certainly
some of the costs inured to the benefit of the public,
unless the entire regulatory scheme is a failure, which
we refuse to assume. 415 U. S. 337-338.
In

the

present

case,

similarly

to

the

local

safeguard

board

public

interest

main

function

is

health.

By imposing a portion of the costs of its operations
22

the

of health's

and

upon the food establishments, those establishments are forced to
pay

for

the protective

Board.

However,

services rendered to the public by the

unlike

the

CATV

operators,

the

food

establishments have not sought licenses from the Board to operate
but

have

already

operation.

obtained

business

licenses

allowing

their

Under these circumstances, the charges embodied in

the fee standard amount to the imposition of an impermissible tax
by the Board.
Even if the charges imposed by the Board under the licensing
fee standard were to be otherwise deemed to be "fees", the lack
of any basis

for

the unequal treatment of the various classes

would render those charges "taxes".

In Smith v. Carbon County,

90 Utah 560, 63 P. 2d 259 (1953), the Utah Supreme Court rejected
a graduated probate fee schedule based upon the dollar amounts
involved in the probate:
That fees may be charged for services rendered in
probate proceedings is not questioned.
From what we
have said, we do not wish to be understood as holding
that the Legislature must fix fees payable in all
probate proceedings the same. What we do hold is that
the amount of fees that may be exacted must bear some
reasonable relation to the extent and nature of the
services rendered.
Otherwise such fees are, in
contemplation of law, taxes. 63 P. 2d at 263.
Whether

technically denominated

"license fees" or "taxes",

Utah Code Ann. Section 10-8-80 (1953) requires all such charges
to be uniform with respect to the classes upon which they are
imposed.
situated,
class.

Classes
with

must

equal

be

composed

treatment

Otherwise,

the

for

of
all

charges
23

all

persons

members
are

of

similarly
each

such

arbitrary

and

unconstitutional.

As the Utah Supreme Court explained in Cache

County v. Jensen, 21 Utah 207, 61 P. 303 (1900):
Neither the constitution nor the statute authorizes. .
ordinances
to tax citizens arbitrarily and
unjustly, by license which confers no privilege that
was not previously enjoyed, and which has no view to
regulation. Unjust and illegal discrimination between
persons, in taxation, and the denial of equal justice,
are within the prohibitions of the constitution of this
state, and of the United States. * * * The law abhors
inequality and lack of uniformity in taxation whether
the burden be imposed by license or by levy and
assessment. 61 P. at 304.
In

this

reasonable

case,

in

relationship

addition
to

the

to

costs

the
of

failure
any

to

"service"

bear

a

to be

rendered, the lack of any "demonstrable benefit" to those upon
whom

the

fees

are

imposed,

the

lack

of

any

request

for

the

service by plaintiffs, and the lack of uniformity of the fees,
the

licensing

business

of

fee
those

standard
food

further

service

attempts

establishments

to

divide
into

the

various

component parts to provide additional fund raising bases, which
constitutes an abuse of power by the Board.

As the Utah Supreme

Court explained in Provo City v. Provo Meat Packing Co., 49 Utah
528, 165 P. 477 (1917) :
A municipal corporation cannot by ordinance under the
delegated general power to tax privileges, segregate
the several elements of right that accrue to the
citizen under one taxable privilege, as recognized,
defined and declared by law, and tax each of such
elements as a separate and distinct privilege of its
own creation, as, for example, by dividing several
privileges into many and requiring separate licenses to
sell special articles which necessarily belong to one
legal privilege, and which the law permits to be sole
under one license. To express the rule in other words,
power to impose a license tax upon a business does not
authorize
a
division
of
the business
into
its
constituent elements, parts, or incidents, and levy a
24

separate tax on each or any element, part or incident
thereof.
165 P. at 479 (citing 3 McQuillan Municipal
Corporations, Sec, 1003).
The food establishments are subject to licensure to operate,
with

fees

operations.

imposed

to

cover

the

cost

of

regulating

their

Food establishments are charged one license "fee" to

operate, which necessarily

involves the preparation and service

of food; another "permit fee" to sell the food; and another "food
handler

fee" for authorizing

persons to handle the food.

The

governing bodies and the local boards of health are attempting to
divide the food service business into its constituent parts for
the purpose of securing additional revenue.

As reflected in the

cases cited above, such a division is not permissible and renders
such action invalid.
The District

Court properly

ruled

that

the licensing

fee

standard as imposed by the Board is a tax and not a fee.
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE BOARD1S FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW MUST BE SUPPORTED BY SOME
EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE PUBLIC HEARING
The legislature has

specifically

required local boards of

health to make Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law after a
public hearing. Utah Code Ann. Section 26-24-20 (1981) provides:
(1)
The board may adopt rules, regulations and
standards, not in conflict with the rules of the
department, necessary for the promotion of public
health, environmental health quality, injury control
and
the prevention
of
outbreaks and
spread of
communicable and infectious diseases, that shall have
the effect of law . . .
(2)
The board shall provide public hearings prior to
the adoption of any rule, regulation or standard . . .
25

(3)
The hearings may be conducted by the board at a
regular or special meeting, or the board may appoint
hearing officers, who shall have power and authority to
conduct hearings in the name of the board at a
designated time and place. A record or summary of the
proceedings of any hearing shall be taken and filed
with the board, together with findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and the order of the board or
hearing officer.
A

public

hearing

and

its resultant

Findings of

Fact and

Conclusions

of Law are legislative requirements to insure that

the public

is given an opportunity to confront, and oppose if

they

desire,

considering
hearing

the bases

particular

and

grounds

action.

upon

which

the

The evidence presented

not

bound

Findings

the

of

by

all

Fact

of

must

the

have

evidence
some

The Board

so presented,

support

in

the

but

the

form

of
a

Findings

judgment

of

lower

"follows

logically

from

court,

from, and

an

they

administrative
must

show

that

the

evidence

presented and the district court properly so determined.
in

at

is

must substantiate those Findings and Conclusions or the

mandate for a public hearing is rendered meaningless.
is

Board

so

Whether

agency

or

a

the Judgment

is supportable by, the evidence."

See Smith v. Smith, 726 P. 2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986).
Utah

Code Ann. Sec. 26-24-20

(1981) contemplates that the

party conducting the public hearing take and file with the Board
a

summary

of

the

proceedings,

Conclusions of Law, and

the

Findings

its order based

thereon.

of

Fact
As

and

earlier

reflected, only one "public hearing" was held in this matter, on
September 10, 1986.

The hearing before the Board itself was not
26

a "public hearing" within the meaning of that Act, as reflected
by

the Board's

failure

to publish

notice of

required under Utah Code Ann* Sec, 26-24-20.

that hearing, as
At the hearing on

September 10, 1986, there was no information presented to justify
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law subsequently entered
by

the Board.

Further,

the person

entering

the Findings and

Conclusions was not present at the hearing, nor was any member of
the Board (R. 48-49, 60-65).

The Board ignored the purposes of a

public hearing and, as stipulated by the parties:
The dollar amounts, categories and definitions applied
to
those
categories
as
reflected
in the "Food
Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee" standard and
fee schedule were prepared by, and adopted based upon
the recommendations of, the Health Department staff.
The staff indicated, and the Board determined based
upon the recommendations of staff and their own
deliberations, that those dollar amounts, categories
and definitions were reasonable.
There was no public
input regarding those dollar amounts, categories, and
definitions. (R. 50, Para. 10)
Rather than having a member or the chairman present at the
public hearing,
conduct
statutes,

the

the Board

hearing,

and

as

copies pf

elected to use a hearing officer to
it

the proposed

available to everyone present.
the

hearing

were

allowed

properly

to

could
fee

under

the

Utah

schedule

were

made

Members of the public attending
voice

their

comments

as

to

the

proposal, but no presentation was made by the Board or its staff
showing

the

differences
or

any

bases

upon

which

the

schedule

was

derived,

the

in cost of inspection of the various establishments

other

information

necessary

reasonableness of the fee schedule (R. 60-65).
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to

determine

the

The

record

reflects

that

the

Board

simply

read

the

legislative mandate for a public hearing and Findings of Fact and
Conclusions

of

suggestions

Law

of

as

its

mere

technicalities

staff.

The

and

adopted

reasonableness

of

the
the

classifications and conclusions embodied in the fee schedule were
not considered.

The staff apparently

indicated

that they felt

the fee schedule was reasonable so the Board adopted it (R. 50,
Para. 10) with no consideration given to:
1. The actual costs of inspections as opposed to other food
service programs;
2.
The
other points
inspections;

effects of cash
where food
is

registers, drive-up windows, or
dispensed, upon the costs of

3. The effects of increased numbers of seats upon the costs
of inspections;
4. The proportionate benefit from the inspection program to
the public in general;
5. The increased benefits to be received by the restaurants
and food establishments; or
6.
The means of dedicating funds obtained for the purpose
of the inspection program to insure that the funding obtained
from the program could not be used for other Board operations or
programs.
These issues, together with other vital issues, should have
been

fully and completely considered by the Board at the public

hearing.
provide

The public

input and ask questions regarding the imposition of the

fee standards.
spirit

should have been given an opportunity to

of

the

The Board satisfied neither the letter nor the
law

in holding

a public hearing

but based

its

Findings and Conclusions on evidence submitted by Board members
and

staff prior

to the hearing
28

and

that was not submitted to

public review.

The record

is wholly devoid of support for the

Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, since the Board
relied

solely on

adopting
into

staff

the licensing

evidence

at

input and its own personal judgment in
fee standard, none of which was placed

the public

hearing.

In

fact,

no

evidence

whatsoever was presented by either the Board or its staff at that
public hearing (R. 60-65).

No evidence or information regarding

the actual cost of the food inspection program for each category
was presented nor was any consideration given to the effect of
the taxes and other licensing fees paid from food establishment
operations.

No evidence appears to explain the rationale behind

the contention that one-third of the cost of the food inspection
program should be borne by inspection fees.
Response'1

was

prepared

and

public hearing (R. 75-79).

submitted

to

The written "Staff

the Board

after

the

On October 2, 1986, a regular meeting

of the Board was held, wherein L. Jed Morrison, chairman, signed
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which adopted the fee
schedule.

The Findings and Conclusions were based solely on the

opinions of the Board staff and reflected a total lack of input
from

the

question

public
the

or

staff

even
input

any

opportunity

(R. 66-72).

for

the public

In short, none of

to
the

information involved in the fee standard arose out of the public
hearing.

Public input as to the reasonableness of the fees was

not considered, and no basis upon which the public could review
that

reasonableness

was

provided,
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although

the

burden

of

establishing

the

reasonable

basis

and

foundation

for

the

imposition of the fees was on the Board.
To allow

Findings of

Fact and

Conclusions of Law of

the

Board to stand without any basis in the record would be to render
the legislative mandate for a public hearing meaningless.

While

the Utah Supreme Court recognized that these provisions regarding
Findings of Fact were generally associated with the adjudication
of

a

claim

and

that

the purpose of

the requirement

for

such

Findings of Fact for these hearings was not clear, nevertheless,
the Court emphasized

that the law clearly required Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law to be entered.
Association, Supra.

See Utah Restaurant

Having determined that such Findings of Fact

are mandated, that mandate must be interpreted
manner.

The Utah Supreme Court has stressed

in a meaningful
the importance of

interpreting a statute in a meaningful manner:
It
is to be observed,
moreover, that
statutory
enactments are to be so construed as to render all
parts
thereof
relevant and
meaningful, and
that
interpretations are to be avoided which render some
part of a provision nonsensical or absurd.
Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P. 2d 934 (Utah 1980).
Pursuant

to

Utah

Code

Ann.

Sec.

26-24-20

(1981),

the

legislature has required a public hearing when a board of health
engages in rule-making or adoption of standards, with resulting
Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law.

The statute must be

interpreted

in a meaningful manner which necessitates that the

Findings of Fact be supported by evidence presented at a public
hearing.

To do otherwise, would render the mandate meaningless.
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Plaintiffs do not contend

that all rule-making actions by

administrative bodies must be based upon evidence produced upon
the record of the hearing where such rules are adopted.
as

reflected

provisions of

in

Utah

that

Restaurant

section are

Association,

somewhat

Indeed,

supra.,

unusual.

the

However, at

least where Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are mandated
by

a

finder

nature

of

of

that

fact

after

public hearing,

administrative body,

Conclusions of Law must be

regardless of

the

the Findings of Fact and

substantiated

by evidence upon the

record.
An administrative body has a primary obligation to base its
determinations on evidence and information introduced at a public
hearing.

Basic

decision

upon

hornbook

law

prohibits

its own knowledge,

secret

it

from

basing

its

staff input, or other

evidence outside of the record, as was done in this case.
Indeed, it is a denial of due process or of the
fundamentals
of
a
trial
or
hearing
for
an
administrative agency to reach a decision on evidential
facts not spread upon the record and upon information
secretly collected and not disclosed, which the party
complaining had no opportunity to examine or analyze,
explain, or rebut.
2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law,

Section 444.

To the same

effect, see 73A C.J.S., Public Administrative Law and Procedure,
Section

126; and

18 A.L.R.

2d, Administrative Law - Evidence,

Section 3.

Utah's courts have s t e a d f a s t l y enforced t h i s r u l e of law in
regard

to a d m i n i s t r a t i v e

denial

of

an a p p l i c a t i o n

agencies.

In a case

to discontinue
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involving

the operation

of

the
an

agency

railroad

Commission

station,

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

allowed

to consider common facts of life formed

the

from common

knowledge and to take judicial notice of such universal facts,
but with limitations:
It cannot take its special knowledge which it may have
gained from experience or from other hearings and base
any findings or conclusions upon such knowledge. That
is fundamental. * * * The commissions cannot act on
their own information. Their findings must be based on
evidence presented in the case, with an opportunity to
all parties to know of the evidence to be submitted or
considered, to cross-examine witnesses, to inspect
documents and to offer evidence in explanation or
rebuttal, and nothing can be treated as evidence which
is not introduced as such.
Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co.

v. Public Utilities

Comm'n, 17 P. 2d

287, 291 (Utah 1932) .
Similarly, in a case involving a decision of the Industrial
Commission, the Court insisted:
(I)t is fundamental that in investigations such as the
Industrial Commission is authorized to make, any party
to a cause or proceeding is entitled to be advised of
and afforded an opportunity to meet such evidence as
the commission may consider and rely on in the making
of its findings and decision. Unless such evidence is
brought into the case, and in some lawful manner made a
part of the record, it cannot be regarded as competent
evidence, and must be excluded in determining the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings . .
(Citations omitted.)
Spencer v. Industrial Commission, 81 Utah 511, 20 P. 2d 618, 620
(1933).
339,

471

See also Clearfield State Bank v. Brimhall, 24 Utah 2d
P.

2d 161

(1970)

Institutions Commissioner
State of Utah

(review of order

of

the Financial

for a unit bank in Clearfield, Utah);

in the Interest of Pilling v. Lance, 23 Utah 2d

32

407, 464 P. 2d 395 (1970) (court's consideration of a social file
not introduced at a hearing was a denial of due process of law).
The Alaska
requirement

Supreme Court has expressed the purposes of the

that

the

facts

found

by

an agency be based

upon

evidence in the record in City of Fairbanks v. Alaska P.U.C., 611
P. 2d 493 (Alaska 1980) :
First, it helps to ensure that the agency does not make
decisions that have no adequate basis in fact; second,
it gives opposing parties the opportunity to challenge
the agency's reasoning process and the correctness of
the decision; and third, it affords reviewing courts
the opportunity to evaluate the decision.
The

Alaska

Court

then

applied

the

facts

of

the

case

to the

purposes of the requirement, explaining that where the evidence
was

not

divulged

at

the hearing,

the opponent had

no way of

knowing the contents of the evidence and:
. (N)o opportunity to subject it to the tests of
cross examination or other means of verification, no
opportunity to rebut it, and no opportunity to argue
that the staff's conclusion did not logically follow
from the information on which it was based. Likewise,
neither this court nor the superior court can evaluate
the Commission's conclusion without the underlying
information.
These fundamental defects amount to a
failure of due process. 611 P. 2d at 495.
As earlier reflected, in the present case, the Board's fee
standards were prepared from the personal knowledge and input of
its members and staff.

Although persons attending

the hearing

were allowed to voice their opinions concerning the imposition of
the fee standards, they were not provided with evidence of the
need

for

the

standards, the cost of

inspection programs, the

effect of business license fees in offsetting
fees

needed

to be

charged

when
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they had

those costs, why

not been previously

charged,

the

methods

categories contained
evidence.

used

in

determining

the

amounts

or

in the Standards, or any other substantive

Similarly, they were denied an effective opportunity

for rebuttal, verification or explanation regarding the bases of
the

Board's

actions,

with

no

opportunity

to

address

the

competency, sufficiency, or accuracy of the input considered by
the Board.

The hearing was apparently intended to satisfy what

the Board considered to be a mere technicality of the Code, not
to secure any valid input nor to allow the public to ensure that
evidence
Board's

was

competent,

sufficient

and

accurate.

Since

the

Findings and Conclusions are not supported by evidence

within the record, a reviewing court has no means to evaluate the
determinations of the Board.
In cases

involving

"impact

fees", "building permit

fees",

and other charges imposed by various cities to help offset their
"growing pains" due to rapid population growth, the Utah Supreme
Court

has

required

certain standards.

that

regulations

imposing

fees

must

meet

The Court explained:

Since the information that must be used to assure that
subdivision fees are within the standard of reasonableness is most accessible to the municipality, that body
should disclose the basis of its calculations to
whoever challenges the reasonableness of its subdivision or hookup fees. Once that is done, the burden
of showing failure to comply with the constitutional
standard of reasonableness in this matter is on the
challenger.
Banberry Development Corp. v. South Jordan City, 631 P. 2d 899,
904 (Utah 1981).

See also Lafferty v. Payson City, supra, and
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Home Builders Association of Greater Salt Lake v. Provo City, 28
Utah 2d 402, 503 P. 2d 451 (1972).
The reasonableness of the fees being
were

challenged

by

the public

at

imposed by the Board

the hearing

and

in written

comments received by the Board prior to the hearing.

However,

the Board did not disclose any basis of its calculations nor was
anyone

from

the

Notwithstanding
the

Board's

Board

even

present

at

the

hearing.

the lack of information at the hearing, one of

Findings

of

Fact was

that

" (W)hile objection

was

raised by several individuals as to the charging of the fees, no
information
proposed

was

fees

brought

forward

which

demonstrated

that

the

. . . was not tied directly to the cost of the

inspection program and to be used to support this cost."

This

Finding reflects that the Board improperly viewed its burden of
determining

the reasonableness of the fee schedule prior to its

adoption.
The Board failed to meet its specific burden of showing the
bases upon which the reasonableness of the proposed fees could be
determined.

The chairman of the Board proceeded

to adopt the

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law relative to a hearing at
which neither he nor any other member of the Board was present,
without any consideration

for challenges from the public.

The

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law from that public hearing
thus

became

a

meaningless

legislative mandate.
should

have

provided

gesture

which

did

not

fulfill

the

The hearing officer appointed by the Board
Findings of Fact and
35

Conclusions of Law

together

with

a

summary

of

embodying the fee standards.
with

his

statutory

duties

proceedings

justifying

the

order

The hearing officer did not comply
and

the

Board

had

no

reasonable

justification for the imposition of the fee schedule.
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law promulgated by
the Board were arbitrary and capricious since they were wholly
without

evidentiary

material

support

in

the

record.

Vital

issues

of

fact were not resolved through the process mandated by

the legislature and those fundamental defects render the Findings
and Conclusions and order adopting the fee standard invalid.

The

District Court's ruling that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law

must be

supported

by

evidence on

the record should be

upheld.
CONCLUSION
The District Court properly determined that the Board had no
statutory authority, nor any
for

inspections

of

food

inherent authority, to impose fees

establishments

under its licensing fee standard.

as

it attempted

to do

That court properly determined

that the fee standard constituted a tax, rather than a fee, since
it

was

public
food

a
and

general

revenue

the community

establishments

raising

measure which benefited

the

as a whole, rather than the specific

against

whom

it

was

imposed.

The

fee

standard was also determined to be a tax because of the lack of
any request for inspections by the food establishments, the lack
of uniformity of the fees imposed, the lack of any basis on the
record

for

the

establishment

of
36

the

various

classes

and

the

unequal

treatment

of

standards amounted
establishments
provide

into

that

classes, and

to a division

additional

determined

those

various
funding

the

of

Findings

of

parts

no

support

in

the

record

That

Fact

of

that

court

and

those

the food

in an attempt to
also

Conclusions

relied upon by the Board were defective and
had

fact

the business of

component
bases.

the

properly
of

Law

invalid since they

the public

hearing.

Based

thereon, the District Court properly ruled that the licensing fee
standard

was

invalid

and

void,

restraining

the

Board

from

imposing any further charges and ordering the refund and return
of payments it had previously received from plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs
District

Court

respectfully

submit

that

the

decision

of

the

was correct and should now be affirmed by this

Court.
ATKIN & ANDERSON

By
Gary E. >tk'in
Attorp^'ys for Plaintiffs
^ "
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the
eight
with

copies of
the Utah

the

foregoing

(S?

day of January, 1988,

Brief

of Respondents were filed

Court of Appeals and

two copies were mailed to

Thomas L. Christensen, Deputy County Attorney, 2001 South State
Street, #S3600, Salt Lake City, Utah

38

84190-1200.

ADDENDUM TO RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
10-8-80.

License fees and taxes.

They may raise revenue by levying and collecting a license
fee or tax on any business within the limits of the city, and
regulate the same by ordinance; provided, that no Utah city or
town shall collect a license fee or tax hereunder from any
solicitor or salesman who solicits, obtains orders for or sells
goods in such city or town solely for resale; and no enumeration
of powers of cities contained in this chapter, shall be deemed to
limit or
restrict
the general grant of authority hereby
conferred.
All such license fees and taxes shall be uniform in
respect to the class upon which they are imposed.
26-1-6.

Fee schedule adopted by department.

The department may adopt a schedule of fees that may be
assessed for services rendered by the department, provided that
such fees shall be reasonable and fair and shall be submitted to
and approved by the legislature as part of the department's
annual appropriations request. Such fees shall be paid into the
state treasury in accordance with Section 63-38-9.
26-24-14.

Powers and duties of departments.

* * *

(14) establish and collect appropriate fees, to accept, use
and administer all federal, state, or private donations or grants
of funds, property, services, or materials for public health
purposes, and to make such agreements, not inconsistent with law,
as may be required as a condition to receiving such donation or
grant;
•

•

26-24-18.

•

Health department fund - Sources - Uses.

The treasurer of a health department shall, on organization
of the department, create a health department fund to which shall
be credited any moneys appropriated or otherwise made available
by participating counties, cities, or other local political
subdivisions and any moneys received from the state, federal
government, or from surpluses, grants, fees or donations for
local health purposes. Any moneys credited to this fund shall be
expended only for maintenance and operation of the local health
department and claims or demands against the fund shall be
allowed on certification by the health officer or other employee
of the local health department designated by the board.

AUG i n il!87

Gary E. Atkin, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
185 South State Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-2552
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION,
a Utah non-profit corporation,
et al.,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
C i v i l No. C86-9024
(JUDGE MOFFAT)

V.

SALT LAKE CITY-COUNTY
BOARD OF HEALTH,
Defendant.

The

above-entitled

matter

came

on

regularly

for

hearing

before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat,
Judge,

presiding;

and

plaintiffs

being

represented

by

their

counsel, Gary E. Atkin, Esq., and defendant being represented by
its counsel, Thomas L. Christensen, Esq., Deputy Salt Lake County
Attorney;

and

the parties having

submitted

the matter

to the

Court upon a Stipulation of Facts and Issues for Determination;
both

parties

having

Authorities and

submitted

Reply Memoranda

their

Memoranda

of

Points

and

in support of their respective

positions; and the matter having been fully argued to the Court;
and

the

Court

having

reviewed

the

Memoranda, as well as

the

pleadings, affidavits, Stipulation of Facts and Issues, and other

documents filed of record; and the Court now being fully informed
in the premises, does hereby make and enter the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
Utah

Plaintiff associations, the Utah Restaurant Association,
Retail

Association,
existing

Grocer's
are

under

principal

places

Association,

non-profit
the
of

laws

and

corporations,

of

business

the
in

State
Salt

Utah
duly

of

Hotel-Motel

organized

Utah,

Lake

and

with

their

and

whose

County,

memberships are composed of persons, corporations, partnerships,
and

other

entities

direct interest

engaged

in, associated

in the restaurant and

the state of Utah, whose memberships

with,

or

having

a

food service industry in
includes numerous persons

whose businesses are operated within Salt Lake County, and which
are

subject

Fee

Standards"

Each of

to the
(the

"Food Service/Food
"fee

standard")

those associations

Establishment Licensing

involved

is a person

in this action.

within

the meaning

of

Utah's Declaratory Judgment Act, Sections 78-33-1, et seq., Utah
Code

Anno.

Rulemaking

(1953),
Act,

as

Section

(1953), as amended.

amended,

and

63-46a-l,

et

Each plaintiff

Utah's
seq.,

Administrative

Utah

is entitled

Code

Anno.

to the relief

sought under those Acts.
2.

The remaining plaintiffs are also persons subject to,

and whose legal relations are affected by, the fee standard and
are persons within the meaning of the Declaratory Judgment Act,
Sections 78-33-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953), as amended, as

2

000?^

well as within the Utah Administrative

Rulemaking Act, Section

63-46a-l, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953), as amended.
3.

The Salt Lake City-County Board of Health (the "Board")

is a non-elected body, appointed by the Salt Lake City and County
Commissioners to act as a local board of health pursuant to the
provisions of Sections 26-24-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953),
as amended,

which provisions

specify

the statutory powers and

duties of the Board.
4.
is

The Board, as a separate body, is amenable to suit and

subject

pursuant

to

to

the

Sections

jurisdiction
63-46a-13,

and

process

Utah

Code

of

Anno.

this

Court,

(1953),

as

amended, and Section 78-33-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953), as
amended.
5.

This is an action brought by plaintiffs pursuant to the

provisions of the aforesaid Sections and Rule 57, Utah Rules of
Civil

Procedure,

validity

and

for

a

declaratory

constitutionality

of

judgment
the

to determine

"Food

the

Service/Food

Establishment Licensing Fee Standards" adopted by the Board.
6.

The exhibits attached to the Stipulation of the parties,

as subsequently supplemented by the parties, reflect all meetings
of the Board relative to the fee standard and the times, places
and

purposes of

those meetings, as well as all actions taken,

comments made, and other input presented at those meetings, and
all notices thereof, which were considered in the formulation of
the Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law relative to
the adoption of the fee standard.
3

7.
items

Except as referred to in Paragraph 6, there are no other
of

testimony,

documents,

papers.

Findings

of

Fact,

Conclusions of Law, or Orders of the Board regarding the proposal
and adoption of the fee standard.
8.•

The

inspections

contemplated

in

the

fee

standard

constitute no change from the inspections previously conducted,
except that previous inspections were paid with Health Department
funds.
9.

Fees collected by defendant pursuant to the fee standard

have not been

expended

but have been deposited

into a Health

Department fund and are reflected, for bookkeeping purposes, as a
credit

to

a

separate discretionary

Health

Department account,

which does not reflect deposits from any other source.

Defendant

intended that this account would be used to pay for a portion of
the food inspection program or, if the court should so direct, to
provide a refund to the persons making the payments.
10.

The dollar amounts, categories and definitions applied

in the "Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee Standards"
were

prepared

and

adopted

Health Department staff.

based

upon

recommendations

of

the

The Board made its determination, based

upon the recommendations of staff and its own deliberations, that
the dollar amounts, categories and definitions were reasonable.
There

was

no

public

input

regarding

those

dollar

amounts,

categories and definitions.

4
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11.

There are no existing genuine issues as to any material

fact relevant to this action which would require an evidentiary
hearing.
BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court does
hereby make and order the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
as

Defendant does not have the authority to impose charges

specified

in

Fee Standards"

the "Food Service/Food

Establishment Licensing

for food service establishments pursuant to the

provisions of Section 26-24-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953),
or

otherwise.

refers

only

preparing

Section

to

the charging

certificates,

specific

26-24-14

services

to

of

(14), Utah
fees

copying

fees,

particular

for

such

and

persons

Code Anno.
minor

similar
for

their

(1953)

items as
fees

for

specific

benefit, such as have been traditionally imposed by governmental
bodies.
offset

The statute does not authorize defendant to attempt to
substantial

salaries and

portions

overhead

of

involved

in

excess

of

total

costs,

including

in particular programs, through

the imposition of such charges.
acting

its

Therefore, since defendant was

its statutory authority

in attempting

to

impose those charges, they should be declared to be invalid, and
null and void ab initio.
2.
by

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as adopted

defendant are unsupported

by

the evidence presented at the

public hearing of September 10, 1986, relative to the adoption of
its "Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee Standards" for
5

food

service

defendant

establishments.

While

the Court

recognizes

that

is not bound by the evidence presented at such public

hearings, the Findings of Fact mandated by Section 26-24-1, et
seq., Utah Code Annotated (1953), should have some support in the
evidence

so presented.

Therefore,

the

standard

imposing

the

charges should be declared invalid, and null and void ab initio.
3.

The provisions of the "Food Service/Food

Licensing

Fee

authorized

Standards" amount

to a

tax.

Establishment

The Board

is not

to levy taxes and, therefore, the standard should be

declared to be invalid, and null and void ab initio.
4.
the

Any charges previously collected by defendant based upon

"Food

Service/Food

Establishment

Licensing

Fee

Standards"

were improperly assessed and should be returned to plaintiffs and
others paying the same.
5.
charges

Defendant should be restrained
pursuant

to

the

"Food

from assessing

Service/Food

Establishment

Licensing Fee Standards^""'
Dated this

/ f

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
Counsel for Defendant

day of [ L^sH<*rtS

further

> 1987

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby

certify

that

I hand

delivered

a

copy of

the

foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the office
of Thomas L. Christensen, Deputy County Attorney, County Complex,
2100 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah

84105, this 3rd
^

day of August, 1987.

7
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Gary E. Atkin, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
185 South State Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-2552

(<L OiAotZ^C^

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION,
a Utah non-profit corporation,
et al.,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. C86-9024
(JUDGE MOFFAT)

v.
SALT LAKE CITY-COUNTY
BOARD OF HEALTH,
Defendant.

The

above-entitled

matter

came

on

regularly

for

hearing

before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat,
Judge,

presiding;

and

plaintiffs

being

represented

by

their

counsel, Gary E. Atkin, Esq., and defendant being represented by
its counsel, Thomas L. Christensen, Esq., Deputy Salt Lake County
Attorney;

and

the parties having

submitted

the matter

to the

Court upon a Stipulation of Facts and Issues for Determination;
and both parties having submitted their Memoranda of Points and
Authorities and

Reply Memoranda

in support of their

positions; and the matter having been argued
the

Court

having

reviewed

said

Memoranda,

respective

to the Court; and
as

well

as

the

pleadings, affidavits, Stipulation of Facts and Issues and other

ooo''-^

documents

filed of record; and the Court having heretofore made

and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; and the
Court being fully informed in the premises, now, therefore:
IT

IS

HEREBY

ORDERED

Establishment Licensing

that

the

"Food

Service/Food

Fee Standards" adopted by defendant are

declared invalid, and null and void ab initio.
IT

IS

FURTHER

ORDERED

that defendant be, and hereby

is,

restrained from attempting to impose any further charges pursuant
to the "Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee Standards".
IT
ordered

IS

FURTHER

to refund

from any of

ORDERED
and

that defendant be, and hereby is,

return any payments previously

the plaintiffs pursuant

to the "Food

received

Service/Food

Establishment Licensing^Fee Standards".
Dated this

/ 0

day of u 4 c ^ c # ^ T 1987.

fat
Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

f/

iu\u^ i-- CJwv^n^—

Counsel

for

Defendant

ATTEST
H. DIXON HINDLEY
CLERK

ey—^Qca

AA
Deputy Clerk

ooo* -

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby

certify

that

I hand

delivered

a

copy of the

foregoing Judgment to the office of Thomas L. Christensen, Deputy
County Attorney, County Complex, 2100 South State Street, Salt
Lake City, Utah

84105, this 3rd day of August, 1987.
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Gary E. A t k i n , SBN 1 4 4
A t t o r n e y for P l a i n t i t r s
185 S o u t h S t a t e S t r e e t , # 4 0 0
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h
84111
(801)
521-2552
IN THE THIRD J U D I C I A L

BY _ v V V - > -

D I S T R I C T COURT,

SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

UTAH RESTAURANT A S S O C I A T I O N , a
Utah n o n - p r o f i t
corporation,
UTAH RETAIL GROCERS A S S O C I A T I O N ,
a Utah n o n - p r o r i t
corporation,
UTAH HOTEL-MOTEL ASSOCIATION, a
Utah n o n - p r o f i t
corporation,
LAMB'S RESTAURANT, FLYING "J"
UTAH FOOD & CATERING, I N C . , DEES
FAMILY RESTAURANTS, KENTUCKY
FRIED CHICKEN-HARMON'S MANAGEMENT C O R P . , GASTRONOMY, I N C . ,
TACO MAKER, I N C . , MARKET STREET
G R I L L , MARKET STREET BROILER
NEW YORKER RESTAURANT, HILTON
HOTELS-PEARSON ENTERPRISES,
SIZZLING PLATTER, I N C . , S T A N ' S
MARKET, N. P . S . , CRYSTAL
PALACE MARKET, WHEEL-IN MARKET,
THE TABLE SUPPLY, VOYLES
MARKET, THE STORE, ALBERTSON'S
I N C . , FAMILY MARKET, SAFEWAY
STORES, I N C . , THE TANNING
EXPERIENCE, O. P . SKAGGS # 1 ,
SAB ENTERPRISES, 8TH AVE.
MEAT AND GROCERY, MACEY'S,
I N C . , B E L L ' S 48TH S T . MARKET,
PETERSON FOODTOWN, F O O D - 4 - L E S S
D A N ' S FOODS, MONTIE'S BESTWAY,
AND H A L E ' S MARKET,
Plaintirrs,

-vs-

SALT LAKE CITY-COUNTY BOARD OF
HEALTH,
Defendant.

STIPULATION OF FACTS AND
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
Civil No.
CBb-902^
Honorable Judge Moffat

r—;--

COME NOW the parties to the above-entitled matter, by
and through their counsel ot record and do hereby stipulate and
agree as tollows:
1.

Plaintiff Associations, the Utah Restaurant

Association, Utah Retail Grocer's Association, and Utah
Hotel-Motel Association, are non-profit corporations, duly
organized and existing under the laws or the State of Utah,
with their principal places ot business in Salt Lake County,
and whose memberships are composed or persons, corporations,
partnerships, and other entities engaged in, associated with,
or having a direct interest in, the restaurant and food service
industry in this state, whose memberships include numerous
persons whose businesses are operated within Salt Lake County,
and which are subject to the "Food Service/Food Establishment
Licensing Fee" standard involved in this action.

Each of those

associations is a person within the meaning of Utah's
Declaratory Judgment Act, Sections 78-33-1, et seq., Utah Code
Anno. (1953), as amended and Utah's Administrative Rulemaking
Act, Section 63-46a-l, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953), as
amended, ana each plamtiit is entitled to the reliet sought
thereunder.
2.

The remaining plaintiffs are also persons suoject

to, and whose legal relations are atrected by, the "Food
Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee" standaard and Fee

-2-

Schedule involved herein and are persons within the meaning or
the Declaratory Judgment Act, Sections 78-33-1, et seq. Utah
Code Anno. (1953), as amended, as well as within the Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act, Section 63-46a-l, et seq., Utah
Code Anno. (1953), as amended.
3.

The Salt Lake City-County Board of Health

(heremai'ter referred to as the "Board") is a non-elected body,
appointed by the Salt Lake City and County Commissioners to act
as a local board of health pursuant to the provisions of
Sections 26-24-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953), as amended,
whose statutory powers and duties are speciried therein.
4.

The Board, as a separate body, is amenable to suit

and is subject to the jurisdiction and process or this Court,
pursuant to Sections 63-46a-13, Utah Code Anno. (1953), as
amended, and Section 78-33-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953),
as amended.
5. This is an action brought by the piaintirfs pursuant
to the provisions or the aforesaid Sections and Rule 57, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, for a declaratory judgment to
determine the validity and constitutionality ot the "Food
Service/Fooo Establishment Licensing Fee" standard adopted by
the Board and which is the subject of this action.
6.

Exhibits "A" through "H", which are attached hereto

and, by reference, made a part hereon, accurately reflect ail
meetings or the Board relative to the standard and ree schedule
-3-

00

specitied therein, which is the subject matter of tins action
and accurately set forth the times, places, and purposes of
those meetings, as well as ail actions taken, comments made,
and other input on that topic at those meetings, and all
notices thereof, which were considered in the ultimate
rormulation or the Board's Findings or Fact and Conclusions or
Law relative to the adoption ot the standard and tee schedule,
as included within those Exhibits.
7.

Except as referred to in Paragraphs 6 there are no

other items ot testimony, documents, papers, Findings of Fact,
Conclusions ot Law, or Orders ot the Board regarding the
proposal tor the adoption ot the standard and fee schedule
which is the subject ot this action.
d.

The inspections contemplated in the aroresaid

standard and tee schedule would constitute no change trom such
inspections previously conducted, except that those previous
inspections were paid with Heath Department runds.
9.

Fees collected to date pursuant to the "Food

Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee" standard and fee
schedule have not t>een expended for any purpose but have been
deposited into a health department rund and are retlected, tor
bookkeeping purposes, as a credit to a separate discretionary
Health Department account, which does not reiiect deposits rrom
any other source.

It is intended that this account would be

used to pay tor a portion of the rood inspection program or, if

-4-
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the Court should so direct, to provide a reiund to the persons
paying the same,
10.

The dollar amounts, categories and derinitions

applied to those categories as reflected in the "Food
Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee" standard and ree
schedule were prepared by, and adopted based upon the
recommendations or, the Health Department stari.

The stall-

indicated, and the Board determined baseu upon the
recommendations of stait and their own deliberations, that
those dollar amounts, categories and definitions were
reasonaole.

There was no public input regarding those dollar

amounts, categories, and definitions.
11.

This action is one which requires the immediate

attention or this Court and an immediate hearing in the
interests or all parties concerned, in that irreparable harm
may result to either or both parties absent such immediate
deterinmation ot the Court, unless the Court's time is rurther
encumbered with a hearing on a temporary restraining order or
injunction.

It appearing that there are no remaining issues of

material iact to preclude a determination on the issues or law
by tins Court, it is respecttully submitted that there is no
need to delay the ultimate hearing herein, with the resulting
necessity of a hearing on a temporary restraining order or
injunction.

-b-

BASED UPON the toregomg stipulations or tact, the
parties seek the Decision ot this Court as to the following
issues of law:
1.

Does the Detendant have the authority to impose

charges such as those specitied in the standard imposing the
"Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee" and fee
schedule tor food service establishments, pursuant to the
provisions ot Section 26-24-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953),
or otherwise and, it not, is the standard imposing those
charges valid?
2.

Did the Defendant comply with the requirements or

Section 26-24-1, et seq.f Utah Code Anno. (1933), in imposing
the "Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee" and fee
schedule tor rood service establishments and, u

not, is the

standard imposing those charges valid?
3.

Are the Findings or Fact and Conclusions ot Law by

the Board (Exhibit " E " ) , supported by any evidence presented at
the hearings on this matter and, it not, is the standard
imposing those charges valid?
4.

Do the provisions of the "Food Service/Food

Establishment Licensing Fee" and tee schedule amount to a
"tax", rather than a "fee"?

If so, the parties stipulate that

the standard is not valid.
Counsel do further stipulate and agree that they shall
rile their mutual Motions for Summary Judgment and supporting
-b-

Memoranda, based upon the foregoing Stipulation within two
weeks from the date of execution of this Stipulation and, that
they shall file any desired responsive Memoranda within one
week arter service of their opponent's Motion and Memorandum,
so as to allow consideration by the Court of tins matter and
soon arter May 29, 1987, as will meet with the Court's Schedule
and, by way or this Stipulation, move the Court ror such an
/ ^

accellerated hearing date.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS r

DAY O F y ^ ^ ^

1987.

:Km, Esq.
for Plaintiffs
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY

*uux •/ mt4Z_
Thomas L. Christensen, Esq.
Attorneys tor Defendant
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EXHIBIT "A"
SALT LAKE E $ CITY-COUNTY
HEALTH ^ D E P A R T M E N T
«!»>-

610 South 2nd East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone: 530-7500 •
HARRY L. GIBBONS, M.DM M.P.H.
Director

NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING

L. tied Morrison, M.D.
Chairman
C O . Clark. D O S .
Vice Chairman
Craig E. Peterson
Crty Government
M. Tom Shimizu
County Commissioner
Robert A. Angle
John M. Sevan, D.D.S.
James Davis, Mayor
South Sart Lake
Janet R. Green
Wilfred Higashi, Ph.D.
Cindy Gust-Jensen
LaRell D. Muir, Mayor
Murray City
Rulon Simmons, M.D.
Lawrence P. Smith, Mayor
Sandy City
Jer\ Taylor
Sandra K. Ercanbrack
Secretary

Before the Salt Lake City-County Board of
Health

In the matter of proposed annual fees to be charged for
inspections Of POOD ESTABLISHMENTSr FOOD SERVICE ESTABLISHMENTS,
AND ESTABLISHMENTS FOR IKE PROCESSING OF MEAT AND MEAT FOOD
PRODUCTS.
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Please take notice that the Salt Lake City-County Board of Health will
conduct a public hearing for the purpose of receiving cannents and
reccrrmendations concerning proposed annual fees to be charged for
inspection Of FOOD ESTABLISHMENTS, FOOD SERVICE ESTABLISHMENTS, AND
ESTABLISHMENTS FOR THE PROCESSING OF MEAT AND MEAT FOOD PRODUCTS.
Authority to charge the said fees is embodied in Section 4.2 of the
respective said regulations of the Salt Lake City-County Health
Departanent, pursuant to Section 26-24-14 (14), Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended.

Copies of the full text of the proposed fee charges are new available
for public inspection at the Salt Lake City-County Health Department
Building,

610 South 200 East,

Salt Lake City, Utah

84111.

Ov)&?*
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A hearing for the purpose of obtaining carments concerning the
proposed fee charges has been scheduled for September 10, 1986,
10:00 a.m., at the Salt Lake City-County Health Deparlnent
auditorium,

610 South 200 East,

Salt Lake City, Utah

84111.

Representatives of food establishments, food service establishments,
establishments for the processing of meat and meat food products,
hospitals, nursing homes, correctional institutions, day care centers,
and the general public within or outside Salt Lake County are
invited to appear and present their views relevant to the proposals.
Oral statements will be accepted at the hearing, but, for accuracy
of the record, written statements are encouraged and will be
accepted at the time of the hearing or prior thereto.
Statements or questions should be addressed to:

Eugene Devenport,

Proposed Fee Charges, Salt Lake City-County Health Department,
610 South 200 East,
number (801)

Salt Lake City, Utah

84111. Telephone

530-7525. Statements will be accepted if received

on or before September 10, 1986,

5:00 p.m.

OVA)'-

POOD SERVICE/FOOD ESTABLISHMENT
LICENSING FEE STANDARDS
This

Standard

of

Section

a

local

26-24-9, U.C.A.

WHEREAS,
fee

schedule

County
ments
State

to

pay

it

for
a

WHEREAS,

26-24-14

Service

Health

the

to

Section I.

Salt

rules
Salt

No. 4
and

Lake

City-County

organized

S

Food

E

T

H

necessary

pursuant

to

establish

City-County

City-County

Salt

No. 5,

and

Establishments!
Lake

:

Salt

Lake

Depart-

and

Health
to

City-County

No.

a

enforcing

pursuant

Lake

in
Health

and

regulations

standard

Salt

:

establishments

and

and

and

S

inspecting

this

The

Salt

health

Lake

Lake

(1953),

THEREFORE,
as

E

of

adopt

Establishments

ordains

of

food

Regulation

NOW,

N

become

expenses

(14) U.C.A.

Department

of

day

(1953).

T

has

portion

local

authorized

I

this

the

food/food service

reasonable
and

by

board

W

is

adopted

, 1986,

Board of Health,
to

is

6,

Section
Health

Food

Sections

City-County

Department

Board

4.2.
of

follows

Definitions:

Food Service Establishments

Restaurants, restaurants/clubs,
restaurants/fast food, cafeterias,
snack bars/fountains, nursing
hemes, day care centers, bars,
lounges, ice cream stores,
or

ooo

any pxace wneire iuuu id ^xci*u.cu ouu

intended for individual portion
service, whether the consunption is
on or off the premises or there is
a charge for the food. This does not
include private homes where food is
prepared or served for individual
family consunption.
Food Establishments -

Tenporaxy Food Service
Establishments -

Grocery stores, bakeriesr candy
factories, bottling plants, convenience
stores, canning factories, meat
processing plants, cold storage warehouses, food storage warehouses, or
similar establishments where food products are manufactured, canned, packed,
processed, stored, transported, prepared,
sold, or offered for sale.

Food Service establishments that operate at a fixed location for not more than
14 consecutive days in conjunction with
a single event or celebration.

Service Bays -

Include, but are not limited to, cash
register stands, drive-up windows, walkup windows, and/or different points from
which food is dispensed or served to the
public. Waited tables are not considered
service bays.

Seats -

Seating that is available for the
public within a food service establishment.
The number of seats shall be determined
by the listing on the business license
application or by physical count by the
regulatory authority.
Banquet seating, not used for everyday
seating, shall not be included in the
total number of seats. The number of
beds, in lieu of the number of seats,
may be used to classify hospitals and
correctional institutions.
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ooor:

Square Footage

-

Square
footage
will
be determined
on the basis of the outside wall
measurements of the food establishment.

Section

II. Annual Fees.

in Salt Lake County

shall

criteria

of

into

assessing

one

annual

be

six

All

food

classified
(6)

service/food establishments

according

categories

for

to

the

the

following

purpose

of

fees:

Category

I

$40.00

Day Care centers, nursing hones and food
service/food establishments providing
either one service bay or zero to ten
seats.

Category

II

$60.00

Food service/food establishments providing either two service bays or
eleven to fifty seats.

Category

III

$80.00

Food service/food establishments providing either three service bays
or fifty-one to seventy-five seats.

Category

IV

Category

V

Category

VI

(a)

$40.00

Food establishments
with
2 r 000
square
feet.

under

(b)

$60.00

2 r 000

to

3,000

square

feet.

(c)

$80.00

3,000

to

5,000

square

feet.

(d) $100.00

5 f 000

square

$10.00 flat
+ $5.00 per
day (not to
exceed $35 total)

Tenporary food
service
establishments
operating
fourteen days or
less.

Section III.

in

Food service/food establishments providing either
four
or
more
service
bays
or seventy-six
or
more
seats.

$100.00

1.

All

advance

on

fees
the

feet

or

more.

General Provisions:
shall
1st

be
day

paid
of

-3-

annually

January

of

and
each

are

due

year,

yeO f '- •'

after
the

the

1st

first

annual

day

year

fee.

of

July,

shall

be

No

fees,

The

Salt

except

at

or

the

any

under

rate

part

Category

of

50

per

thereof,

may

VI, the
cent

be

fee

(50%)

of

refunded

or

for
the

transferred.
2.
attenpt

to

lishment

prior

mination
due.

of

Fees

will be
amount

each

to

unpaid

of

such

to

(90) days

pay
of

annual

five

per

cent

(25%)

and

Salt Lake City-County
opportunity
or

for

suspension
4.

establishment
ment

may

a

of

In

5,

and

hearing

to

right

determining

food

hospitals,

nursing

cent

to

the
be

right

assessed

Department

4.2,

or

operate

original

for

other

I. Food

establishments

that

will

classified

square "footage.

have multiple

twenty-

returned

to

4,

and

the revocation

nonpayment

of

fees.

service
Health Departand other

criteria.

classified

units

check.

4.2, the

notice

facilities,

be

suspension

Section

reconsider

reasonable

hemes will

amount.

Regulations No.

City-County

correctional

or

each

establishment/food
Lake

the

after ninety

provide

due

date

operate. A

and No. 6,
shall

fees

(25%) of

the

to

its deter-

due

revocation

centers

by

the

result

Day care

be

and

of

charges

Salt

seats, beds, or

of

additional

consider

to

due

of

per

in

shall

service estab-

amount

added

Department

categories, the

by

be

Health

Section

Health

the

classify

institutions

and

with

the

twenty-five

charge will

No.

Department

are

(45) days

shall

permits

fees

and

date may

3. Consistent
Section 4.2,

of

fees

due

food/food service

which

forty-five

fees which

the

an

assignment,

penalty

Health

establishment/food

date

after
a

City-County

food

the

category

assessed

Failure

of

notify

Lake

under

as Category
one roof

of

this

be

invalid,

or

applications

clause,

standard

end

from

the

the

application

invalidity

of

sentence,

independence
this

such

or

this

or
the

shall

invalid

provisions

not

standard.

paragraph

of

of

thereof

The
this

be

affect

the

other

valid

part

of

standard

provisions

this

shall

or

standard

shall

application

is

declared

held

to

provisions

any
be

given

and

to

to be

severable.

Section
fifteen

(15)

days

APPROVED

IV.

ttiis

after

Standard

shall

become

effective

its passage.

and ADOPTED

on

the

day

and

year

first

above

written.

SALT

LAKE

CClY-OOUNTir

BOARD

OF

HEALTH

By:
Chairman

Voting
Voting
Voting

(0887J)
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PUBLIC HEARING
September 10, 1986
RE:

PROPOSED FOOD INSPECTION FEE STANDARDS

FOR:

SALT LAKE CITY-COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT

PRESENT
Senator Haven Barlow
Eldon Riding
Keith Murray
Spud Warren
Julie Peck
Robert Cohne
Max Fillmore
James V. Olsen
Ron Morgan
Stan Briggs
Bil Larson
Dee Jordan
Earl Hardwick
Burr Miller
LaMar Evans
Fred Ball
Robert Walsh
Emalynn Heath
Stephen Hurt
Carolyn Masters
Ken Masters
Paula Coyle
Donald Beck
Michael Berg
Hersh Ipaktchian
Ray Ascani
Joan Perry
Senator Jack Bangerter
M. Lindberg
Lee Hutchinson
Tom Christensen
Glenn Austin
Bryan Gray
C.J. Santoro
Keith Comlee
Howard Stephenson
Eugene Devenport
Bill Davis
Doyle Parton
Terry Sadler

REPRESENTING
Self & Many Legislators
Flying J Inc.
Jordan Queen Restaurant
Flying J Inc.
Utah Hotel Motel Association
Self
Utah Restaurant Association
Utah Retail Grocer's Association
Utah Restaurant Association
Utah Food & Catering
Stewart Sandwiches
Dan Glo's Restaurant & Lounge
Chairman - Salt Lake City Council
Holiday Inn - Downtown
Utah Restaurant Association
Salt Lake City Chamber of Commerce
Business Enterprise Program
Business Enterprise Program
Salt Lake Tribune
Jimax Lounge
Jimax Lounge
Dan Glo's Restaurant & Lounge
Utah Licensed Club Association
Holiday Inn - Downtown
Utah Restaurant Association
Cedar Lounge
West Valley City Business License
Utah State Senate
Self
Self
Salt Lake County Attorney
Afterwordi Restaurant
Utah Restaurant Association
Marriott Corporation
Warren's Restaurant - Roy, Utah
Utah Taxpayer's Association
Salt Lake City-Co. Health Department
Salt Lake City-Co. Health Department
Salt Lake City-Co. Health Department
Hearing Officer

The deadline to receive written comments was set at Wednesday,
September 10, 1986, at 5x00 p.m. in the Administration Office
of the Salt Lake City-County Health Department.
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Julie Peck, Administrative Assistant for the Utah Hotel
Motel Association, read and submitted written comments. The
Association is opposed to any collection of fees for health
inspections. They find it ironic that the County would require
period inspections of their restaurants- and then charge for the
inspection. Ms. Peck stated the restaurants contribute to the
cost through the fees for food handler permits, business, licenses
and taxes collected.
Robert Cohne, representing himself as a private taxpayer,
strongly opposes the proposed food inspection. Mr. Cohne, a
former restaurant owner, urged the Health Department to seek
additional funds to cover the inspections from the County Commission from the current tax base.
Max Fillmore, President of the Utah Restaurant Association
(URA), read and submitted written comments. The URA strongly
objects to the fee and recommended that it not be approved. Mr.
Fillmore stated the Health Department exists for the benefit and
protection of the general public and that operating expenses
should be paid from the general tax fund. The department should
also consider creative methods of filling the inspection need
other than increasing staff and assessing special fees. Mr.
Fillmore suggested that the Health Department should deal
directly in problem areas and conduct less frequent inspections
of restaurants with higher scores.
Burr Miller, representing Holiday Inn - Downtown, stated
the proposed fees would create a great burden to an already redlined restaurant.
Don Beck, Utah Licensed Club Association, represents the
111 licensed private clubs in Utah, 54 of which are in Salt Lake
County. The Association strongly supports the earlier comments
made by the Utah Restaurant Association and the Salt Lake Area
Chamber of Commerce in opposing the proposed food inspection
fees. Mr. Beck stated the fees are an unfair tax against the
food industry and urged the Health Department not to adopt the
standards.
Earl Hardwick, representing the Salt Lake City Council
District #4, opposes the proposed standards and classified it
as a user fee. Adoption of the fees would result in nothing but
a negative economical impact on facilities required to have the
inspections. The services are to ensure the safety of the
general public and should be a general funded item.
Hersh Ipaktchian, URA Legislative Chairman, read and submitted written comments. Mr. Ipaktchian strongly opposes the
proposed fee and feels it is another example of government
singling out a particular industry to solve an in-house budget
problem. This issue has statewide impact since other Utah
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STATEMENT OF POSITION .
SALT LAKE AREA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
BOARD OF GOVERNORS
SEPTEMBER 9, 1986
The Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce Board of Governors, in their
bimonthly meeting held on September 9, 1986, came out unanimously
against the proposed special fee to finance health inspections.
It was the consensus of the Board that the present inspections
are essential to the public health and are a direct benefit to
the tax payers and residents of this .county. It is a needed service
to have the inspections, but is discriminatory to expect that the
inspected facilities should be mandated to pay a fee for such
service.
It is our understanding that the duration,.frequency and content
of the inspections are the direct responsibility, and at the convenience of the City/County Health Department. This arbitrary scheduling and frequency presents a burden on the food service industry
which they should not have to bear. The industry currently pays
a great deal of property tax to the taxing entities and also pays
fees for food handlers1 permits. These taxes, coupled with additional charges such as business licenses and other such charges,
consitute a true threat to profitability and success.
Several members of the Board of Governors expressed concern regarding the potential of escalating fees, such as this, aimed at
'specific businesses already sorely pressed to make a profit. These
businesses are already paying health taxes and user fees to government entities.
The Board of Governors of the Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce
regards this proposed fee as a tax increase, and we feel that tax
increases should be dispersed so that they are not "sock it to
business" taxes. Since all citizens benefit from the inspections,
the Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce believes that all citizens
should assist in bearing the cost of such inspections.
Sincerely submitted,

Fred S. Ball
President and General Manager
Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce
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The health inspectors have no more right to inspection fees than the
firemen do for their inspections.

Then what*about the meat

inspectors, weights and measures, etc* are they all going to follow
suit?

The real issue here is who actually benefits from these

inspections?

The general public is who the health department and

the other inspectors are protecting.

It isn't a matter of whether the

grocer wants or invites the inspectors into our businesses.
control over if or when we will be inspected.

We have no

Therefore, if the

inspection fee is adopted, it would be conceivable to think they may
want to increase the inspection frequency or length, after all the
businesses would be paying for the inspections.
justify a fee increase.

What better way to

Let's make sure the people who are getting the

benefit are paying for the service.

If the public wants or needs

inspections then they will have to be willing to pay the price with thei
taxes.

This is upfront and above board, not another hidden tax which

the business, if it wants to do business in Salt Lake County, has to paj
Then the businesses are forced to pass on these costs of doing business
to their customers, through higher prices.

The business takes the

blame for the increase, and the people who are really paying for these
government services have no understanding or knowledge of what they are
really paying for.

If the health department needs additional revenue

then they need to go through the proper budgetting process with the cit;
and county and justify their need to the elected officials and public.
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I

HAVE

A

STATEMENT

TO

HOTEL MOTEL ASSOCIATION; I

READ
AM

ON BEHALF OF MEMBERS OF THE UTAH
JULIE

PECK,

THE

ADMINISTRATIVE

ASSISTANT THERE.

WE

ARE OPPOSED TO ANY COLLECTION OF FEES FOR HEALTH INSPECTIONS.

WE FIND IT IRONIC THAT THE COUNTY WOULD REQUIRE PERIOD INSPECTION
OF

OUR

RESTAURANTS, AND THEN TURN AROUND AND CHARGE US FOR THAT

INSPECTION...PARTICULARLY SINCE WE CONTRIBUTE TO THE COST THROUGH
THE

FEES FOR FOOD HANDLERS PERMITS. BUSINESS LICENSES, AND TAXES

COLLECTED.

AS AN INDUSTRY WE ARE BEING SINGLED OUT -ARE ALL OTHER

BUSINESSES

WHICH

REQUIRE

INSPECTIONS

GOING

TO

BE ASKED TO PAY FOR THOSE. OR JUST THE FOOD SERVICE INDUSTRY?

IN

ANY

CASE.

WE

CONCUR

THAT THIS IS UNFAIR AND

WITH

THE UTAH RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION

DISCRIMINATORY.

AND

WE

WILL

DO

WHAT

IS NECESSARY TO SEE THAT THIS DOES NOT TAKE PLACE.

ML

rriUATEDWITH / * ^
WAN HOTEL & CT^PI
.ASSOCIATION h i Ld

fjO^^l

The proposed annual fees for Inspection of foodservlce and food-related establishments
are just another example of government singling out a particular industry to solve an in-house
budget problem.

The issue goes far beyond the size of the fee itself and far beyond the

proposal in Salt Lake County. • /This issue has statewide impact since other Utah counties
will follow suit by levying their own fees.

We oppose the fee for a major reason.

The URA has traditionally supported the concept of health inspections as an essential
service to the public.

These Inspections do nothing to help restauranteurs in the operation of

their business; rather, the whole purpose of these inspections which are required by Utah law
is to help protect the public from food-borne illness.

If such a service is so essential that it

is required by law for a general public purpose, then that service should be financed through
general funds, not a specific fee penalizing the restauranteur.
in my restaurant, I do so for my own protection.

If I install a security device

It will be silly for me to charge other

restaurants or businesses for the cost of my own security system, since it benefits me and I
should pay for it.

It would be equally silly for me to expect a tax credit since the system

would lessen demands on the local police force.
fees:

The same reasoning applies to the proposed

If public services are for the benefit of the public and, In f a c t , required by law, then

financing should come from public funds.
In addition, health departments already receive special monies to offset the costs of
inspections.

Our employees are required by law to pay for food handler's permits.

How man;

other businesses are regulated to the extent that their employees must pay the government
in order to acquire work?

We are already one of the most regulated businesses in the countr

and we pay a variety of special taxes, assessments and fees on equipment and menu items.
The fees pile up, and yet, according to a recent National Restaurant Association survey, the n
profit of an average restaurant is less than 3%.

Additional fees and taxes will only reduce

this percentage while having no positive impact on business.
If this proposal is adopted, what will we see next?
charge us special fees for fire protection?

Will counties and municipalities soor

Will we see special fees for police protection?

Since some restaurants receive a high traffic volume, will these firms be assessed a special fe
for highway and road improvement?

Everytime there is a budget crunch, will a government at

rush in to assess a special fee or tax?

And how high will the fee go?

As businessmen we

know that a fee of $60 today will soon be increased to $100, then $150, whatever amount is
needed to solve the government's problem.
Restaurants are shown to have one of the highest rates of business failure, and the last
thing government should do is start Increasing taxes by disguising them as a special f e e .

If

there is a budgetary problem within the health department, then that department should eithe
obtain more funding from the general public or tighten its own financial belt.
needs more money, he or she works harder or becomes more productive.
the health department should do the same.

If an individua

We believe that

RESTAURANT

MAX FILLMORE, PRESIDENT OF UTAH RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION, READ A

FEES

STATEMENT IN BEHALF OF THE ASSOCIATION.

THAT STATEMENT IS

ATTACHED HERETO AS EXHIBIT A, AND BY REFERENCE MADE A FART
HEREOF.

MR. FILLMORE WENT ON TO EXPLAIN THAT HE FEELS THE FROFOSED
INSPECTION FEE SCHEDULE IS A VERY IMPORTANT ISSUE.

HE DID NOT

FEEL DETAILED SPECIFICS WERE MADE AVAILABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE
FEE SCHEDULE, AND SERIOUSLY QUESTIONED THE NEED FOR THE FEES,
BUT IF THEY ARE NECESSARY, THE SOURCE FOR THOSE FUNDS SHOULD BE
THE GENERAL TAX FUND AND NOT FROM FEES OR FROM THE TAXFAYERS.
MR. FILLMORE STATED BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS, LEGISLATORS.
TAXPAYERS, THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, AND THE AREA COUNCIL DO NOT
FEEL FEES ARE NECESSARY.

MR. FILLMORE REPRESENTED THAT SENATOR

HAVEN BARLOW STATED THAT IT WAS NOT THE INTENT OF THE
LEGISLATURE IN 2 6 - 2 4 - H , UCA, TO ESTABLISH A PROCEDURE FOR FEE
COLLECTION, AND THE LEGISLATURE SHOULD REVIEW THAT SECTION FOR
CLARIFICATION.

MR. FILLMORE MENTIONED THAT NONE OF THE BOARD

MEMBERS WERE PRESENT FOR THE PUBLIC HEARING HELD SEPTEMBER 10,
19B6, AND HE QUESTIONED HOW THEY COULD, IN GOOD CONSCIENCE, VOTE
ON A PROPOSAL THAT HAD NOT BEEN CLEARLY DISCUSSED.

GARY ATKIN, ATTORNEY FOR UTAH RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION, STATED
THAT HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE APPROACH TAKEN ON IMPOSITION OF
FEES.

HE DID NOT FEEL BOARD MEMBERS WERE AWARE OF THE FEELINGS

OF RESTAURANT OWNERS AND THE OPPOSITION TO THE FEES AT THIS
STAGE.
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GENERAL DISSATISFACTION WAS EXPRESSED ABOUT THE PUBLIC
HEARING.

HR. ATKIN STATED THAT THERE WAS NO BACKGROUND

INFORMATION DISCUSSED, AND NO ONE REALLY ANSWERED THE QUESTION
WHY FEES NEEDED TO BE IMPOSED.

THIS INSPECTION SHOULD BE PAID

FOR BY TAXES OR TAKEN OUT OF THE BUDGET.

NOTHING WAS STATED AS

TO WHY THE AMOUNT OF FEES WERE NECESSARY, NOR HOW THE FEES WERE
DETERMINED.

MR. ATKIN CITED A COMPARISON BETWEEN FEES FOR DAY

CARE AND NURSING HOMES, AND RESTAURANTS.

THE QUESTION WAS ASKED

HOW THE COST TO THE RESTAURANT WAS DETERMINED.

FOR EXAMPLE,

WHAT IS THE DIFERENCE BETWEEN A RESTAURANT WITH ONE CASH
REGISTER AND 10 TABLES AND A RESTAURANT WITH TWO CASH REGISTERS
AND 10 TABLES.

HOW IS THAT FEE DETERMINED?

MR. ATKIN STATED

THAT NONE OF THESE FACTORS HAD BEEN PRESENTED AT THIS STAGE.

THE HEARING OFFICER SHOULD HAVE PRESENTED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FOLLOWING THE HEARING.
FACTORS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED.

NONE OF THE NEGATIVE

THE IDEA OF A FUBLIC HEAPING IS

TO CONSIDER ALL THESE THINGS AND LET PEOPLE ASK QUESTIONS, BUT
THE ONLY THING THEY WERE TOLD WAS THAT FEES WOULD BE IMPOSED.
THE QUESTION, "WHAT DO YOU HAVE TO SAY ABOUT IT?" SHOULD HAVE
BEEN ASKED.

MR. ATKIN STATED THAT THE FEE WAS INAPPROPRIATE AND THE ACTION
TAKEN WAS QUESTIONABLE.

HE STATED THEY HAD BEEN THROUGH THIS

WITH DAVIS COUNTY, AND RESORTED TO THE COURT TO SETTLE THE
ISSUE, AND HE REALIZES THAT SALT LAKE COUNTY HAS AN ADVISOR JUST
AS DAVIS COUNTY DID, AND WE WANT TO BE SURE AND "WE WANT TO BEND
OVER BACKWARDS AND MAKE SURE THAT WE HAVE CROSSED OUR Ts AND

DOTTED OUR Is".

WE NEED TO BE SURE WHERE THE FEES ARE GOING TO

GO AND WHAT TO EXPECT SO THERE IS NO APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT.

BILL DAVIS STATED THAT HE RECOGNIZED THE CONCERN OF THE
RESTAURANT OWNERS, BUT THE DEPARTMENT HAD GONE THROUGH THE
PROCESS OF DETERMINING THE NEED AS WE HAVE EXPERIENCED COSTS IN
THE PROGRAM AND STILL FELT THE MEED TO SUPPLEMENT THROUGH FEES.

THIS IS A MANDATORY PROGRAM THAT IS DONE SIMILAR TO THE
ASBESTOS PROGRAM.

ADOFTION OF FEES AS A PART OF REGULATIONS

DATES BACK TO 19B1 WHEN FEES WERE INSTITUTED FOR SOLID WASTE.
SINCE THAT TIME FEES HAVE ALSO BEEN INSTITUTED FOR OTHER
INSPECTIONS.

MR. DAVIS STATED THE CONCEPT IS THAT FUNDING

SHOULD COME FROM GENERAL TAXES, BUT IF THAT WILL NOT SUFFORT
PROGRAMS, THE USER FEE IS A REASONABLE WAY TO HELP SUPPORT THE
COST OF THE PROGRAM.

WE BELIEVE THOSE COSTS WILL PE CARRIED

THROUGH TO THE CONSUMER FOR USE OF SERVICE.

AS TO THE AMOUNT OF THE FEE, STAFF FELT THE FEE WAS VERY
REASONABLE AND DETERMINED NOT TO GO FOR THE FULL AMOUNT OF THE
COST OF THE PROGRAM BEING SUPPORTED BY THE FEE.

A PORTION OF

THE FEE WAS BUDGETARILY ACCEPTABLE TO THE STAFF, AND THE
RESTAURANT CAN PASS THE FEE ON TO THE CONSUMER.

STAFF DID MAKE AN EFFORT TO GAIN INPUT.

THIRTY DAYS WERE

ALLOWED FOR COMMENTS PRIOR TO THE PUBLIC HEARING.

THE PROPOSED FEE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE BOARD, AND AN EFFORT

WAS HADE TO GAIN INPUT AS PART OF THE PUBLIC HEARING FRQCESS.

STAFF FELT THEY HAD FOLLOWED THE SUPREME COURT GUIDELIIIES WHICH
OUTLINED PROCEDURES THAT SHOULD BE FOLLOWED.

A SPECIFIC ACCOUNT

HAS INCLUDED IN THE BUDGET AND THE FEE HILL BE ALLOCATED TO THAT
ACCOUNT.

RECORDS HILL BE KEPT TO SHOW WHERE FEE COLLECTIONS GO

AND WHAT THE FUNDS ARE SPENT FOR.

DR. BEVAN ASKED IF STAFF KNEW HOW MUCH MONEY THIS FEE WOL'LD
RAISE, HOW MUCH THE SERVICE COSTS, AND WHAT PORTION OF THE COST
WOULD BE RAISED THROUGH FEE COLLECTION.

DR. GIBBOUS RESPONDED

THAT FEES WOULD PRODUCE SLIGHTLY LESS THAN HALF THE COST OF THE
PROGRAM.
FEES.

ALL OTHER PROGRAMS ARE APPROXIMATELY 507. FUNDED BY

A FEE IS CHARGED FOR IMMUNIZATIONS, AND THE INSPECTION

AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAM IS TOTALLY SUPPORTED BY FEES.

TAMARA HHARTON STATED THAT THE FEE IS NECESSARY BECAUSE OF
RISING COSTS AND LOSS OF FEDERAL MONEY.

SHE FELT IT WAS

UNFORTUNATE THAT A TASK FORCE WAS NOT SET UP TO STUDY THIS, BUT
REVIEW OF THE MATERIAL REVEALED THAT CALIFORNIA, NEVADA AMD
NEBRASKA HAVE CHARGED FEES FOR YEARS.

PEOPLE ARE REALLY TED UP

HITH BEING TAXED AND TAXED, AND SHE FEELS THERE SHOULD BE A
FEE.

THERE HERE SOME CONCERNS EXPRESSED THAT THE FEE WOULD

SKYROCKET, BUT DR. GIBBONS STATED THAT STAFF WORKS CLOSELY WITH
THE BOARD, AND COULD NOT INCREASE THE FEE HITHOUT BOARD
APPROVAL.

RON MORGAN, UTAH RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION, STATED THE BASIC
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OBJECTION OF THE ASSOCIATION WAS THEY ARE TOLD THE HEALTH
DEPARTMENT IS COMING TO INSPECT OUR RESTAURANTS AND THEY
THEREFORE FEEL THE COST SHOULD BE PAID FROM THE GENERAL FUND.
IF WE LOOK BACK HISTORICALLY, WE FIND FEES START OUT VERY SMALL
AND THEN BEGIN TO EXPAND.

THE RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION IS HOT

ONLY LOOKING AT TODAY, BUT FIVE TO TEN YEARS FROM TODAY.

IF

HEALTH IS INSPECTING AT OUR REQUEST, THEY SHOULD CHARGE US.

TWO MEMBERS OF THE STATE SENATE WERE PRESENT AT THE HEARING AND
BOTH SAID THAT IT WAS NOT THE INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE TO
PROVIDE FOR FEES.

THE INTENT WAS TO CHARGE THOSE FEOOLC WHO

COME AND PROVIDE A SERVICE FOR MYSELF OR MY FAMILY.
POINT IT IS APPROPRIATE TO CHARGE A FEE.

AT THAT

MR. MORGAN FELT THE

HEALTH DEPARTMENT STAFF CONVEYED THE IDEA, "WE REALLY DON'T CARE
WHAT YOU GUYS SAY".

THE RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION WENT TO THE

SUPREME COURT ABOUT THESE ISSUES, AND IF THE BOARD OF HEALTH
IMPOSES THIS FEE,THE ASSOCIATION WILL GO BACK TO THE SUPREME
COURT ON THE FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD ISSUES.

THE LEGISLATURE,

IN JANUARY, WILL SAY IT WA5 NOT OUR INTENT FOR THIS TO HAPPEN.

DOUGLAS SMITH COMMENTED THAT MR. MORGAN'S SUPPOSITION ABOUT WHAT
THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGISLATURE WOULD DO WAS GUESTIMATE AT
BEST, AND HE DID NOT FEEL THAT SUPPOSITION APPLIED TO THE
ADOPTION OF THIS FEE.

A QUESTION WAS RAISED ABOUT THE

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE RESTAURANT ORGANIZATIONS AMD A BANK.

A

BANK IS EXAMINED REGULARLY AND IS REGULATED FOR THE PROTECTION
OF THE DEPOSITOR.

MR. MORGAN COUNTERED THAT BANKS ARE EXAMINED

IN ORDER TO QUALIFY FOR FEDERAL INSURANCE.

BANKS ARE EXAMINED

AND PAY A FEE TO PROTECT THE DEPOSITORS TO MAKE SURE THE
DEPOSITS ARE SECURED.

RESTAURANTS SHOULD BE INSPECTED TO MAKE

CERTAIN THAT ACTIONS BEING TAKEN ARE IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE
PUBLIC.

MR. MORGAN CITED A RECENT CONTACT WITH THE STATE

REGARDING SUMMIT SAVINGS.

BANKS ARE EXAMINED SO THEY CAN

OUALIFY FOR FEDERAL INSURANCE.

THIS IS FOR THE PROTECTION OF

THE DEPOSITORS.

MR. MORGAN STATED THAT THEY WANTED TO CLARIFY TWO OR THREE
POINTS THAT DID NOT GET THROUGH AT THE PUBLIC HEARING.

DICK BOLLARD STATED THAT THE DEPARTMENT IS MANDATED TO PERFORM
INSPECTIONS AND RECEIVES FEES FROM OTHER PROGRAMS, AND IT DOES
NOT SEEM THAT HEALTH IS SINGLING OUT THE RESTAURANT
ASSOCIATION.

MR. BOLLARD WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE SUFREME COURT

RULING AGAINST DAVIS COUNTY WAS ON A TECHNICALITY RESULTING FROM
A PROCEDURAL ERROR.

THE INTENT TO COLLECT FEES WAS NOT REALLY

OBJECTED TO IN THAT ACTION.

PAUL MC CLURE STATED THAT HE COULD FEEL FOR THE RESTAURANT
ASSOCIATION BECAUSE HE OPERATES A BUSINESS AND COSTS ARE VERY
CRITICAL TO BUSINESSMEN.

AN ORGANIZATION TO WHICH HE BELONGS

RECENTLY VOTED ON THE ISSUE OF FEES ON A NATIONAL LEVEL.

MR.

MC CLURE DIRECTED THAT THE RECORD SHOW THAT HE IS OPPOSED TO
USER FEES, AND THAT HE FEELS AS A GOVERNMENT AND COUNTRY, WE
HAVE GONE OVERBOARD IN REGULATIONS AND ASSESSING FEES.

UPON MOTION OF DR. JOHN SEVAN, THE

BOARD VOTED TO ACCEPT THE
RECOMMENDATIONS TO INSTITUTE USER
FEES FOR RESTAURANT INSPECTIONS.
MR. MC CLURE OPPOSED THE MOTION.
CINDY GUST-JENSON ABSTAINED FROM,
THE VOTE.
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SALT LAKE CITY-COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT
FOOD SERVICE/FOOD ESTABLISHMENT
LICENSING FEE STANDARDS
FINDING OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Salt Lake City-County Health Department carries out responsibilities
of food inspection in Salt Lake County. This authority is granted to
the Salt Lake City-County Health Department by the Local Health Department
Act of the Utah Code Annotated Title 26, Chapter 24.
2.

Section 26-24-14(14) allows local health departments to charge fees to
carry out its responsibility.

3.

On September 10, 1986, a public hearing was held in order to receive
public comment regarding the fees. Notice of the public hearing was
advertised August 10 and 23, 1986, in the Salt Lake Tribune and Deseret
News at-least 15 days prior to the public hearing.

4. A summary of comments received at the public hearing was presented to
the Board of Health at its regular scheduled Board of Health Meeting on
October 2, 1986.
5. While objection was raised by several individuals as to the charging
of the fees, no information was brought forward which demonstrated that
the proposed fees standard was contrary to state or local laws, was
excessive, or not tied directly to the cost of the inspection program
and to be used to support this cost.
6.

The Board finds that the proposed Food Inspection Fee Standard is
consistent with the charging of fees in other Salt Lake City-County Health
Department regulations such as the Asbestos Regulation, Massage Parlor
Regulations, Swimming Pool Regulations, etc., and that the proposed fee
does not single out food establishments in the charging of fees.

7. The actual cost of the Food Inspection Program at the Salt Lake City-County
Health Department is $453,000. Current fees for food handler perr.itc total
$25,000. Cost of the Food Inspection Program not covered by current fees
totals $430,000.
8. The proposed fee schedule will generate approximately $156,000, v/hich is
approximately one-third the total cost of the Food Inspection Program.
9. Money collected by the proposed fee will be deposited in an account of
the Health fund set up specifically to receive monies generated by the
proposed standard.
10. Funding to support the Food Inspection Program will be drawn from the
account mentioned above in Item #9.

GOO

-2The Salt Lake City-County Board of Health, therefore, concludes that
the proposed food fees are reasonable and consistent with other fees
charged by the Department, that proper procedures have been followed in
developing the fees pursuant to Section 26-24-20, that the proposed fees
will be used to support the Food Inspection Program, and that the fees are
legal and meet the intent of Section 26-24-14. Therefore, the Board adopts
the fees standard as attached this
2nd
day of
October
, 1986.

son, M.D., Chairman
City-County Board of Health
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EXiiltui

STAFF RESPONSE TO COMMENTS AT THE PUBLIC HEARING HELD
SEPTEMBER 10, 1986
This paper combines and summarizes the comments made at the
hearing related to the proposed food service inspection fees and
gives the response of the Health Department staff to these comments
-1MENT:

The food service industry is barely making a profit.
This fee will cause a detrimental effect en profits and
a loss of business and jobs.

r\FF RESPONSE;

The staff was reas onable in the amounts proposed for the
fee standard. The maximum amount to be charged is
$100.00 per year f or Category IV or Category V establishments, which have 76 or more seats or 5,COO or more
square feet of flo or space. At the most, this amount
figures to be. $1. 32 per seat or two cents a square foot,
To be even more re alistic, we estimate that the annual
fee would cost a f raction of one cent per meal served,
At the rates propo sed, we believe the fee will not bea significant detr iment in lost profits, business or
jobs.

)MMENT:

The purpose of the inspection is to protect the public;
therefore, the burden of cost should be born by the
public and the general tax. Tax increases should come
from the regular budget process.

rAFF RESPONSE:

It is true the purpose of the food service inspection
is to protect the public but in this case, as it is in
many other cases, it is not the general public that is
causing the threat of foodborne illness. The "public"
creating the potential problem should carry primary
responsibility to prevent it. We believe, however, support for the fee will ultimately come from the general
public or customers of food establishments as the cost
is passed on to them through the meals or food purchased,
As James V. Olsen, President of that Utah Retail Grocers
Association, stated in his hearing comments, "...the
businesses are forced to pass on these costs of doing
business to their customers through higher prices". The
cost that will be passed on will be minute.
If it was the intent of the Utah State Legislature thru
the Local Health Department Act Section 26-24-16 that
only general tax dollars be the source of funding for
local health departments, it appears they are creating
a contradiction in Section 26-24-14(14). If Section
26-24-14(14) was intended only for the establishment of
fees where a direct benefit is received (e.g., fee for
a birth certificate), it does not so state, and, if the
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legislature cecides
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ui& law ^ ; lirtit fees
only to direct benefit., . r wi * make it necessary for
local health departments to snift the source_of fundinc
tc he property tax.
If this shift causes an increasin property tax, the public would be ooposed,
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so than th^ imposi* , ^ ^
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regular budget process have been exnaustec, altrougn we
never dismiss this alternative in evaluating our programs. The County Commission feels they have received
a clear Dublin T-^-i-> - *-r *
rrooerty taxes net le raised
COMMENT;

A special Mi^up of businesses have beer, s.rgiea w.
required tr ••*• ^.-cectec. - • ;i tr>-~.
charged for the
inspectior

STAFF RESPONSE:
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la ted 01 f j s e usi ng the service. In es tablishing this
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ou+~
Permit or in spection fees have already beer esta"department for asbe s tos control, mat
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sage establishment s, bar re' and reaut y shops, swimming
pools, solid waste haulers and t icilities, septic tank
inspections, and t a11oo establishment s. TM-re is a fee
schedule ir t v ! -* \, '.g facility regulation. which is
now goinc through the public coursent procesc. Co n s i stency r; n the pub lie point of view a nd the point cf vie*of those already c barged for a fee wo uld dictate that
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MMENT:
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efficiency, u
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belt.
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and tighten its

T::e department has always arn! wil. continue : :>***.'•• .^f adopt efficiencies prior t .* ^ki ;g bu : ,- - .ncreasei
The department'F reputatic
- clear tr
_ts budget submitted each year is a "bare nones" Mid
In 1970, Salt
Lake County's population was 480,
t -.3increased
over 700,000. Food «^ laonsnments ha\ e
increased 5-8% per year and now totals 3,000. The
National Environmental Health Association recommends an
average workload of 150 food establishments per sarn\.:rian. Our workload is 250.

'•••P-0'

With this remarkable increase in workload, the Food Protection Program has not had an increase in staff in the
past 10 years. Rather, the excellence of the-program
has been maintained through efficiencies and creative
management. A number of efficiencies were.created with
the computerized "SPIF" (Sanitation Program Information
Formulator) Program. This program provides timely and
meaningful data for each sanitarian. Food establishments
that receive a low score receive greater attention and
more frequent inspections, data is easily collected,
tabulated and reported, inspection patterns and scores
are readily available, and time sequences for reinspections are determined. Other efforts to "tighten our
belt" have included cutting the inspection program for
preschools and nursing homes and not picking up inspections of group homes, hourly day care facilities,
extended care facilities and halfway houses.
As an alternative to the department training all food
handlers, a food establishment has the option of having
its manager trained and the manager, in turn, training
his employees. Unfortunately, few food establishments
have implemented their own training program.
Other agencies, both in and out of county government,
have reviewed the department and its individual programs.
Those reviews may be summed up in a statement in a March,
1986, report by the Utah Foundation. It states, "Expenditures of the Salt Lake City-County Health Division in
1984 appear significantly less than expenditures of 1974,
if the 1974 figures are adjusted for inflation and the
increased number of people served. Over the same period,
health services appear to have approximately doubled.".
ZOMMENT:

The fee is an unfair tax and tax increase. The food
industry already pays taxes, license fees, and food
handler permits to support the Food Protection budget.

STAFF RESPONSE:

The inspection fee is not a tax and it is not unfair or
hidden. Authority to establish the fee is based on
Section 26-24-14(14) of the Utah Code Annotated (Local
Health Department Act). An individual often does not
know what is included in his tax statement, where the
taxes are going and how they are being spent. The food
inspection fee on the other hand is a specific amount,
the payer of the fee knows what it is for and should see
a direct result. The fee is earmarked and can be spent
for no other purpose. There is a specific accounting
and auditing procedure set up to handle the fee and
determine its efficiency.
Even though the food service industry pays other taxes,
those taxes are not intended to cover the costs of the

000'^

Health Department
. .,
-s defray the cost of t-"
municipal and county agencies but no license fee mone
goes to the Health Department, Food handler_permit fet
are not paid by the food establishment. They are pail
by the individual emplovpe when he/she H- ^* •<* *,
c
COMMENT:

imposi: , •
departme*-*

•? wiii.
follov.

c. precedent that other heal
T*ned in Davi^ fount" and

STAFF RESPONSE:

Imposing a pexmit _r Aasp»-.
let :J uuver * - e cost:.
of the department is not a ne* precedent. It ^as alrea
been in practice several other programs with. cur
Department and by other local health departmer.t"
:ve
local health departments, including Tooele County, Eear
River District, Southeastern Health District, W-asatcr;
County and Utah County, have set fees. The fees we ha\
set are comparable to those being proposed in these ctr
jurisdictions considering the size of the depar4"-0-*- -•
number r-.r -r *: ?/: 1 i shme^t er.:v jurisdiction.
To say that the ec -*. oc^e r.. . ed that a ret v. .::..._•. oe
imposed because of rh* Davis - unty attempt is incorre
That attempt failed because specific lega" :i >JC.:J.
were not followed in establishing the fee, ree^ can be
imposed if the legal procedures are followed. The Utar
State Supreme Court ruled that in promulgating a fee,
standard findings of fact should be entered that are
comprehensive eno..c
allow determination if the fees
have been designe.i ana collected to actually defray some
or all of the cos's of inspecting food service establis*
ments. The Boar: : Health and the staff -*-*» *-* :-••';
these leg .a - :' • 'ecures.

2(yAfAVtvrz

Once the fee . • imposed, -. *. ~ill escc-' to increase.

»Tiniii i wr.'il'UN'.jL.

To assume ". :
• „ .
. -rrease .-. ..,
- 3 continued
source of hr.pjn; ieiray inspection c:^l
;:. jnrealistir
However, i * ihi. \AU be kept m x.nd that the Hea^1:
Department :• ::r^"tice of net increasing fees- ha- 5t^..
outstanding.
ase in point ib
_.._ .r.i^k lr-spectior. : ^
which has not *,.jreased in the past 8 year..
^ sertr..
focd inspection fees, any subsequent increases will be
by the Board of Health
ot the staff. The Board has
always been sensitive •
-leeds of :\ose affected by
the fee increase.
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Food Service Inspection Fees
Are Necessary Health Step
In the area of public health
protection, food service inspection
should have top priority. There are
more reported outbreaks of disease
associated with food consumption
than from all other environmental
causes combined, according to the
Utah State Health Department.
But inspection staffs in the state's
12 health districts historically have
been grossly understaffed due to lack
of funds. The result has been fewer
inspections of public eating establishments, sometimes only once a year
rather than the legally-required once
every six months, particularly in
multi-county districts where great
travel distances are involved.

cade, necessitated by growing state
and federal demands on it, was
deeply slashed below requests the
past two general sessions. So deeply
the previous health director resigned
in protest that the department's
mandatory responsibilities could not
be carried out with the reduced
appropriations. It was a case of slash
vital services and the public be
damned or assess fees to maintain
them.
•. :
*. . .r
In response, the legislature in 1981
authorized the health department to
charge for publications and services
previously provided free. In protesting the Davis County fees, the
executive director of the restaurant
, association contends it was not the
In a 1972 survey, 45 percent of the' legislature's intent to include restaurfood service outlets in Utah were ants in a fee system. But they are not
rated "inadequate" and, by law, exempted in the new law. It states
could have been ordered closed for broadly that "the department may
health reasons. A Bureau of Sanita- adopt a schedule of fees that may be
tion survey just completed shows assessed for services rendered by the
significant improvement overall, but department, provided that such fees
restaurants scored worse than shall be reasonable and fair . . . "
schools or taverns.
.<; '•
The Davis County schedule apThe national formula for adequate pears
and fair, fees based
health protection is one sanitarian on sizereasonable
and number of operating days
per 15,000 population. On that basis, annually, expected to cost each
Utah is 41 sanitarians short. Davis eating establishment between $15
County now has only five and should and $60 a year. That should impose no
have 11.
• hardship on restaurant owners.
To help defray the cost of inspecThere is ample precedent in
tions and build up the program, Davis charging the private sector for public
County Department of Health has services their activities necessitate.
taken a long-needed step of charging Builders pay for septic tank inspecpublic food outlets a modest annual tions and other services. Industry
service fee. The Utah Restaurant pays for health department review of
Association is fighting the action, pollution control plans. The dairy
seeking a court injunction. '« •
business pays inspection fees.
The Davis County move stems from
,The new restaurant fees are an
tightened state purse strings in recent appropiate investment in public
years and follows a course outlined by health. The inspection program is
the legislature.
essential and should be brought up to
The burgeoning budget of the Utah full strength rather than drift into
Department of Health the past de- neglect through lack of money.
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being regulated by State and Federal Law, and the companies already comply with
those regulations. Mr. Bird complimented the Board in their efforts in
developing the R e g u l a t i o n s .
Upon motion of Richard Bollard, seconded
by Douglas Smith, the Board unanimously
voted to accept the proposed changes and
adopt Asbestos Regulations. Staff will
be required to present an annual report
to the Board.
Food
Establishinent
Licensing
Fees

Terry Sadler reported that a few years ago restaurant fees were
discussed, but no action was taken because Utah Restaurant
Association filed a lawsuit. The District Court suit was
appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, and a ruling was handed down
that Davis County did not follow protocol with their public
hearing. The court did not rule on fees. California, Nevada
and T e x a s , as well as other s t a t e s , already charge fees. Mr.
Sadler circulated an information sheet which listed various
c a t e g o r i e s , d e f i n i t i o n s , and respective fees for the named
categories.
Staff met with Mr. Ron Horgan of Utah Restaurant Association and
Mr. Jim Olson of Utah Retail Grocers Association to discuss a
user fee. Every food establishment that is inspected should be
charged a reasonable fee. Mr. Sadler estimated cost of food
inspections to be approximately $ 6 0 0 , 0 0 0 . Health presently
generates approximately $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 , but it is anticipated that
$ 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 could be generated if collection of fees were to be
instituted.
Dr. John Bevan stated he felt inspections of food
e s t a b l i s h m e n t s was very appropriate and that a fee should be
charged.
Upon motion
seconded by
unanimously
hearing for

of Dr. John Bevan,
Jan Green, the Board
voted to approve a public
restaurant inspection fees.

Inspection of food dispensed through vending machines was also
discussed. Those foods are inspected at the packaging site.
Douglas Smith inquired about food handling and sanitation in
those instances where c o r p o r a t i o n s , p a r t n e r s h i p s and companies
invite clients to their establishment and serve food, but are
not really set up to handle groups.
Is dishwashing adequate, and
is sanitation by those handling the food adequate?
He feels
these e s t a b l i s h m e n t s should also be subject to food inspections.
Dr. Gibbons stated this would be a matter for future
consideration by the Food Division.
Fee
Increases

Kent Fitzgerald circulated information relating to proposed
increases in fees. The information included a description of the

ooo^i

!

, I'

~*« -

CITY-COUNTY

LAKE

DEPARTMENT

HEALTH

*«;

610 S ill. INxl East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone: 530-7500
HARRY 1 CStBBONS,

Director
September 16 f 1986

BOARD OF HEALTH
L. Jed Morrison, M O
Chairman
C O . Clark. D O S .
Vice Chairman
Craig E. Peterson
City Government
M. Tom Shimizu
Coi/nly Commissioner
Robert A. Angle
John M. Bevan. D.D.S.
James Davis. Mayor
South Salt Lake
Janet R. Green
Wilfred Higashi, Ph.D.
Cindy Gust-Jensen
LaRell D. Muir. Mayor
Murray City
Ruton Simmons. M.D.
Lawrence P. Smith, Miyor
Sandy City
Jeri Taylor
Sandra K. Ercanbrack
Secretary

• - Wednesday, September 11), PJHli, n e h e l d a p u b l i c h e a r i n g
and completed a 30-day comment p e r i o d on t h e Proposed Food Estab
l i s h m e n t I n s p e c t i o n F e e s . I am e n c l o s i n g , f o r your r e v i e w , ft- r>
following:
1.

I III

mi i mi ni ni ni ni • ill III

I mi in ni mi II in mi I I

2.

Minutes of the public hearing (copies of llit* written comments
submitted a I the hearing are AIM i Lihlo upon request)

3.

A draft copy of the conclusions of law and findings of f act
th.if are necessary an pmf «m f thr Mile-making process,

4

An outline of the issues raised U i I hose making comments
•mil staff respoir.e to those comment.!.

impression 1 received from snmo of the comments leads
^xeve that there are many individuals who do not under-e great effort we have made to maintain an efficient and
active food protection.program, including the efforts our
Committee who reviews our programs,, sets pri orities and
*..*.tax dollars are spent wisely.
We can be proud of our Food Protection Program. It serves
i wital public health need in Salt Lake County and has been an
Iilary program, not only for Utah, but is so recognized in
many areas of the United States, Filling the existing need ! ,,
not been easy. We have maintained excellence, but we feel we
have economized to the point public health may be jeopardized.
We have not had an increase in food protection staff in the f: JS!
J 0 years, yet today we inspect 3 .000 food establishments compared

ooof

Page Two
Board of Health Members
September 16, 1986
to 2,000 that existed 12 years ago. The past few years we have
been experiencing a 5-8% growth rate in establishments, not
taking into account the increase and workload created by temporary events such as the Utah Arts Festival, neighborhood fairs,
holiday parades and celebrations and other mass gatherings.
During the 1970's, 30C of every food dollar spent was in a food
establishment. During the 1980*8 this figure has risen to 40C
and by 1990 is expected to rise to 50C. Last year, because of
improper food handling at a single event, there was a confirmed
foodborne illness affecting 300 people. The threat of foodborne
illness is ever present.
Our efforts as a health department to economize and become
more efficient will continue. As I have stated in recent Board
Meetings, however, I strongly feel the need for this inspection
fee to be adopted so the maintenance of an excellent program may
continue. Please review the enclosed documents carefully. If
you have any questions, comments or suggestions, please contact
me.
Sincerely,

M.D., M.P.H,
HLG/WLD/bc
Enclosures
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